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INTRODUCTION 
 
We live in a society that is continuously evolving, and technologies change daily. We accept 
certain risks without really realising what they imply. In this sense, we accept the need to 
deliver our personal information to companies that presume that they can keep our 
information secure for an indeterminate time, under any circumstances, and that they will 
not sell our personal information to the highest bidder. It is unknown to anyone that every 
time we fill out a form, sign a contract, or accept the terms and conditions of a product we 
are delivering personal information that companies can use in various ways. The information 
delivered to different services is used in diverse ways that can damage our physical and 
spiritual/digital integrity. Usually, when we access certain services, we will realize that we 
are delivering personal data of a different nature to certain institutions that can use this 
information to harm us. Today, not only are we exposed to a simple invasion of privacy, but 
we can also be exposed to identity theft, online fraud, companies are monetizing with the 
collection of your personal data, or worse, influence in the political decisions of each person 
through the collection of private data1. 
 
Today, the services that people use in society have taken the privacy of each person to a 
terrain in which the vulnerability of a person's data has increased considerably. One of the 
most common cases has to do with social networks. Social networks can be referred to as “a 
virtual community or profile site; a social network is a website that brings people together 
to talk, share ideas and interests, or make new friends. This type of collaboration and sharing 
is known as social media. Unlike traditional media that is created by no more than ten people, 
social media sites contain content created by hundreds or even millions of different people.”2  
Every time we use a social network service, we are accepting tacitly that our privacy is being 
violated whenever there is an intermediary for the transfer of our information. What is more, 
all the content we upload to our account on social networks becomes social data, in this 
sense, it is possible to understand social data such as our geographical location, our language, 
the links we share, etc. This brings with it a series of consequences since this data is very 
precious for marketing companies that seek to generate a profit in sales. 
 
1 BBC Mundo. (2018) 5 claves para entender el escándalo de Cambridge Analytica que hizo que Facebook 
perdiera US$37.000 millones en un día. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-43472797 
2 Computer Hope. (2019).  Social network. Computer Hope Free computer help since 1998. 
https://www.computerhope.com/jargon/s/socinetw.htm 
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The right to privacy is an essential element of each legal system, and it can be both nationally 
and internationally which the main objective is to curb the actions of the state and private 
parties that threaten the privacy of individuals3. Privacy is an ambiguous concept that can 
be interpreted differently depending on the culture, but it is possible to interpret it as the 
ability of individuals to isolate themselves as persons or to isolate information about them, 
and therefore selectively disclose it to other individuals. The right to privacy is recognised 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”), and from this right, it is possible 
to derive others, such as the Right to Data Protection. The right to data protection as a right 
derived from the right to privacy is possible to understand as a tool that is used by the right 
of privacy to ensure that individuals are protected from any abuse of their personal 
information by another individual4. Although there are academics who can understand the 
right to data protection as a mere tool of the right to privacy, there are legal systems that 
recognise the right to data protection as an independent right to the right to privacy5 . 
Therefore, it would be possible to talk about a duality regarding the right to data protection 
that has a tool function and right at the same time. To describe this duality raised above, it 
is necessary to understand how the right to data protection and the right to privacy is 
understood, specifically in the United States (“US”) and in the European Union (“EU”). In 
the United States, the right to privacy has always been understood as an element of freedom, 
and it is the right to be free from state interference.6 The academic Gavison suggests a 
definition of the right to privacy in which the interest in privacy is given in the fact of giving 
access, either physically in the invasion of one's own space, or buying private information 
about a person, and by both removing his anonymity.7  On the other hand, the European 
Union encompasses from another point of view the right to privacy, every human being is 
endowed with human dignity8, and within this human dignity, it is possible to understand 
that there is a right to maintain a private, autonomous life that people have control of their 
 
3 Warren, S. D; Brandeis, L. D. (1890). The Right to Privacy. Harvard Law Review, Vol. IV, pp. 193-220. 
4  GVZH. Data Protection vs. The Right to Privacy. GVZH Advocates. https://www.gvzh.com.mt/malta-
law/data-protection/vs-the-right-to-privacy/ / 
5 Granger, M.-P., and Irion, K. (2018). ‘The right to protection of personal data: the new posterchild of 
European Union citizenship?’ in: de Vries, S., de Waele, H., and Granger,  M.-P.,  eds.,  Civil  Rights  and  EU  
Citizenship (Cheltenham: Edward  Elgar  Pub.), 3-4. 
6 Warren, Brandeis, supra note 3. 
7 Onn, Y. (2005). Privacy in the Digital Environment. Haifa Center of Law & Technology. Pp 61, 68.  
8  United Nations. (1948). Universal Declaration of Human Rights. https://www.un.org/en/universal-
declaration-human-rights/. Articles 1-2 
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information, to be left free9. Privacy in the European Union is not only a right granted to an 
individual, but it is also integrated as a social value10. 
 
The author of this thesis will direct his work to understand the Privacy Law in the United 
States, specifically the Right to Data Protection. To conduct this work, the author of this 
thesis will take two models, the first model is the model of the United States in terms of 
privacy and data protection, and the second model is the model of the European Union in 
terms of privacy and data protection. To begin analysing the right to data protection in both 
legal systems, it is necessary to provide an understanding of how the right to privacy is 
conceived in the model of the United States and the European Union. Therefore, the author 
of this thesis before rigorously delving into the development of the right to data protection 
in both models will cover the right to privacy in the model of the United States and the 
European Union. The data protection system will be developed in the US model through 
various laws on data protection and its relationship with the different international treaties 
regarding human rights. While in the European model it is possible to draw a correlation 
between the right to data protection and the different international human rights treaties since 
the European Union consecrates data protection as a fundamental right in the article 8 
European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights (“EU Charter”). 
 
It is necessary and interesting to compare the United States and European state model 
regarding privacy and data protection since, while the European Union makes an express 
reference to the right to privacy in its article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
("ECHR") and its article 7 EU Charter, the same does not happen in the case of the United 
States. Although the Constitution of the United States does not explicitly guarantee a Right 
to Privacy, the United States Supreme Court has made up for this omission and has made an 
extensive interpretation of the first, third, fourth, fifth, ninth and fourteenth amendments to 
guarantee the right to privacy to the citizens of the United States. Although the judges of the 
Supreme Court of the United States have understood that the right to privacy is implicit in 
 
9 Privacy International. PRIVACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS An International Survey of Privacy Laws and 
Practice. Global Internet Liberty Campaign. http://gilc.org/privacy/survey/intro.html  
10 Solove, D. J. (2010). The meaning and value of privacy appeal for a pluralistic definition of the concept of 
privacy. Open! Platform for Art, Culture & the Public Domain. https://onlineopen.org/the-meaning-and-value-
of-privacy. 
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the amendments to the constitution11, it does not provide full legal protection as it is not 
expressly contemplated in the Constitution of the United States.  
 
There is a tendency to consider that personal information in online media is in danger, more 
than half of the citizens of the United States believe that their personal information is more 
insecure today than compared to five years ago12. The study prepared by the Pew Research 
Center13 shows the little faith that United States citizens have in private or public institutions 
to protect their personal information. The United States has legislation regarding data 
protection; however, there is no central federal regulation regarding data protection, as can 
be seen in the European Union and the General Data Protection Regulation. It is not possible 
to speak of comprehensive legislation regarding the protection of data in the United States, 
but it is only possible to speak of a series of laws regarding data privacy that is focused on 
the privacy of consumers and that it emanates from the states to its residents. 
 
There is no general framework that regulates the right to data protection in the United States 
as it can be found in the European Union. There is a fundamental difference between both 
structures, and this is that in the European Union data protection and privacy, in general, are 
fundamental rights in its legislation, and it is possible to enforce it, while this kind of 
protection cannot be found in the United States legislation.  
 
Data protection is of utmost importance in a modernised society. All companies have 
information about their clients, such as personal files, product information, financial 
transactions, etc. The importance of this information lies in that the administrative decisions 
of a company are typically based on the personal data of its customers to make a more 
efficient and successful product. It is even possible to point out that there are companies that 
are dedicated to making profits through the management of personal data. Therefore, data 
protection should be the number one priority when regulating the legislative framework 
regarding data protection. In a specific case, it is possible to take the case of cell phones. 
 
11  Mr. Justice Black in his dissenting opinion concerning the Griswold v. Case. Connecticut challenged 
majority opinion by finding and applying the right to privacy in the United States Constitution. See more 
Stanley v Georgia; Roe v. Wade (1972). 
12 Smith, A. (2017). Americans and Cybersecurity Many Americans do not trust modern institutions to protect 
their personal data – even as they frequently neglect cybersecurity best practices in their own personal lives. 
Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2017/01/26/americans-and-cybersecurity/  
13 Ibid. 
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Not all people use social networks, but it is possible to point out that most of the population 
in the United States use a cell phone. It is possible to say that 90-91 per cent of the population 
of the United States has or uses a cell phone14. 
 
Our cell phones, even if we are not using them, leave records of the places we visit. Cell 
phones connect to specific antennas of your service provider company, so it is always 
leaving a trace of the places you are visiting. In addition, with only 4 points containing a 
timestamp and location taken from the data collected from a cell phone, researchers have 
been able to track 95% of people15; The applications that we have installed on our cell 
phones have provided researchers with the necessary knowledge to know the personal 
information of their users such as religion, marital status, languages, your tastes, etc.16; 
Researchers can use the data generated from your cell phone calls to define in advance and 
classify your contacts in relation to family, social or work17. The information or personal 
data that we deliver to the companies in exchange for the provision of the service we are 
doing it involuntarily since we are not aware of the amount and importance of the 
information that we are delivering. In the case of the United States' privacy system and the 
third-party doctrine18, we will realise that for the judicial system of the United States, this 
information is being voluntarily delivered. 
 
The problem with the doctrine previously mentioned is that it was thought with the 
technology existing in the 20th century, but the judges of the Supreme Court of the United 
States would never think about the technological advances that would exist in the 21st 
century. Today we live in a digital society in which countless companies keep our 
information; therefore, the implications of the third-party doctrine are gigantic. The 
information of our geolocation is available for the companies that provide us with 
communications services; our documents and media are stored in cloud services; our internet 
 
14  Lee, R. (2013). Cell phone ownership hits 91% of adults. Pew Research Center. 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/06/cell-phone-ownership-hits-91-of-adults/ 
15 de Montjoye, Y., Hidalgo, C., Verleysen, M. (2013). Unique in the Crowd: The privacy bounds of human 
mobility. Sci Rep 3, 1376, pp 59. https://doi.org/10.1038/srep01376  
16 Seneviratne, S., Seneviratne, A., Mohapatra, P. and Mahanti, A. (2014). Predicting user traits from a 
snapshot of apps installed on a smartphone. ACM SIGMOBILE Mobile Computing and Communications 
Review, 18(2), pp.1-8. http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2636244 
17 Min, J. K., Wiese, J., Hong, J.I. and Zimmerman, J. (2013). Mining smartphone data to classify life-facets 
of social relationships. ACM SIGMOBILE Mobile Computing and Communications Review, pp. 285-294. 
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2441810  
18 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
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activities generate a profile of our behaviours and tastes; etc. The third-party doctrine is one 
of the main reasons why the fourth amendment protection cannot be applied in cases 
concerning 21st-century technologies. 
 
The author of this thesis will later demonstrate and explain how the system of the right to 
privacy and the right to data protection is built in the United States and the European Union. 
The concept of privacy in the United States, and even more the concept of the right to privacy 
can be problematic in its definition since it is continuously evolved through the thinking of 
prevailing societies, and the development of new technologies. Technology has modernized 
various areas, the way we store our information has changed, and the way we communicate 
has also changed. In addition to this transformation, how we have interrupted or placed an 
exception to the privacy rules is not new, since it is possible to think that people thought that 
the mail should be private, but there are exceptions, such as the use of a postcard19.  
 
There are a growing fear and a sense of vulnerability as society advances in terms of our 
privacy. Technology has reached such a point that it is not possible to imagine our modern 
life without the devices we use every day and that they are also collecting information 
"necessary" for its operation. This information includes various edges such as where we are 
going, with what people we are interacting with, and even what our preferences are, just to 
name a few examples. The use and collection of this information can be used for different 
reasons, but the value of personal data must always be taken into account since if personal 
data is combined with the consequence that corporations do not have the technical material 
means to protect our information, we are talking about a hand grenade that can destroy 
people's life. The corporations have frequently shown us that they have failed to protect our 
most sensitive information 20 , or that the government is watching us 21  through the 
information that we voluntarily or involuntarily decided to share. There are solutions to this 
problem/threat, it is possible to abandon the modern era and seek to live without the need to 
resort to technology, but that would be a solution for hermits. A complete solution that 
adapts to modern times is to seek broader protection that requires the discussion of new laws 
 
19  Menand, L. (2018). Why do we care so much about privacy?. The New Yorker. 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/06/18/why-do-we-care-so-much-about-privacy 
20  Newman, L. H. (2017). All the Ways Equifax Epically Bungled Its Breach Response. Wired. 
https://www.wired.com/story/equifax-breach-response/  
21 Wired. (2014). Edward Snowden. Wired. https://www.wired.com/2014/08/edward-snowden/  
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that ensure our security in the digital life we lead or at least the creation of a new regulatory 
framework in which personal data is protected in the United States is sought. 
 
The objective of this thesis is to analyze two of the models for data protection that exist in 
the world. The first model is the model that we can find in the United States in which the 
protection of personal data is sought through targeted regulation across sectors22. There are 
several shortcomings to this model since, as there is a regulation on the protection of 
personal data across sectors, which is contained in various federal and state laws, it is not 
possible to grant complete protection and easy understanding to natural persons. In contrast, 
the European Union model, which is mainly based on the General Data Protection 
Regulation (“GDPR”) as the central norm that regulates the right to data protection in Europe, 
gives more substantial protection to the recipients of the norm by containing greater 
protections, rights and be based on a single regulation. The problem is to investigate is 
whether the regulation of data protection of the European model through GDPR has been 
able to influence the American model. Therefore, the questions that require development 
and research are the following: 
1) The first problem to answer and to develop is to understand why the European model 
of data protection has had a global impact which has led countries outside the 
European Union to adopt similar regulations. The latest regulation issued by the 
European Union regarding data protection, better known as the GDPR, has achieved 
that one of the largest economies in Latin America has adopted a similar version of 
the text of the European Union and consecrated the lei geral de proteção de dados23. 
2) The second problem to develop is why the data protection system in the United States 
has adopted a regulation focused on industry sectors, in contrast to the European 
Union model that has developed a general regulation that covers the protection of 
data in general. 
3) Finally, the existing dilemma will be answered and analyzed as to whether the model 
of the European Union has managed to influence in a certain way, the model imposed 
by the United States. In this case, the latest regulations issued by the state of 
California and future bills regarding data protection in the United States will be 
analyzed. 
 
22 Shawn, M. B. (2017). Data Protection in the United States: U.S. National Report. Indiana University Robert 
H. McKinney School of Law Research Paper No. 2017-11 
23 Lei Nº 13.709, (14th of August 2018). República Federativa de Brasil. 
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The methodology and technique used to achieve the objective and conduct the analysis of 
my research will be the analysis of the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United 
States in which the Right to Privacy has been developed; In the case of the European Union, 
work will be done through the analysis of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights ("ECHR"). Then, the Right to the Protection of Personal Data will be analyzed in 
both legal systems, contrasting it with the different international treaties on Human Rights. 
Finally, the research problem and the questions will be answered. The comparative method 
will be used during the development of this thesis to contrast the model of the European 
Union with the prevailing model in the United States. 
 
The thesis is made up of 3 chapters. The first chapter aims to examine the Right to Privacy 
in both legal systems. You will realize that one of the first differences between both legal 
systems that in the system maintained by the United States there is no express mention of 
the Right to Privacy in the United States Constitution, but rather the Right to Privacy has 
been developed through a broad interpretation of the Amendments to the United States 
Constitution made by the judges of the Supreme Court during the 20th century. The 
prevailing system in the European Union differs mainly in being explicitly enshrined at the 
constitutional level. 
 
In the second chapter of this thesis, the Right to Data Protection in the system of the United 
States and the European Union is analyzed using a comparative method. The impact of 
different international human rights treaties that indicate the existence of a Right to Data 
Protection and how they affect the regulatory system of both models will be analyzed. 
Finally, a presentation is made of Regulation (EU) 2016/679, better known as GDPR that 
regulates the data protection environment in the European Union. 
 
In the third chapter of this thesis, the author of this thesis seeks to answer the question of 
why the European Union model in terms of data protection, specifically the GDPR has had 
a scope outside the European Union that has motivated others countries outside it to adopt 
similar regulations or to inspire their regulations on European data protection principles. In 
addition, it also develops why the United States model has focused on regulation across 
sectors or focused on specific sectors to be regulated, while the European Union model has 
sought a different approach in terms of protecting data, its approach is based on a general 
11 
 
regulation. Lastly, it will seek to determine if the European Union model has managed to 
influence in any way the United States model, in this case, it seeks to analyze whether the 
latest regulation issued by the state of California has an approach to the European model and 
GDPR. 
 
 
 
Keywords: privacy, data protection, right to data protection, right to privacy, human rights 
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CHAPTER I. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN THE US AND THE EU 
 
1.1 THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
The United States Constitution does not have an express reference to the right to privacy. 
Justice Louis Brandeis has noted that “The makers of the Constitution conferred the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by all civilized men—the right to be let 
alone.”24 However, despite the fact that the Federal Constitution does not expressly mention 
the right to privacy, we will realize that the construction of jurisprudence by the Supreme 
Court of the United States has granted protection to different ranges of values that they can 
be derived from the concept of the word privacy. 
 
The Supreme Court of the United States has defined some protection in some of the 
amendments to the Constitution of the United States, for example in the First Amendment 
which indicates “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or 
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress 
of grievances.”25 Association privacy has been recognized26; the right to public expression 
through anonymity27; and political privacy28. 
 
There are other interests protected in other Amendments of the Federal Constitution of the 
United States that will be developed in this chapter, but due to the limitations imposed by 
the judicial process and also because the Constitution of the United States only offers 
protection against intrusion of the government, it is necessary to develop laws that seek the 
protection of the privacy of the individual. 
 
 
 
 
 
24 Olmstead v. United States, 217 U.S. 478. (1928) 
25 U.S. Const. amend I. 
26 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) 
27 Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) 
28 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) 
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1.1.1 The evolution of the right to privacy in the US. 
 
As explained above, in the United States, the Supreme Court first recognized the Right to 
Privacy with the case of Griswold v. Connecticut to be developed later. Prior to this case, 
Justice Louis Brandeis had pointed out that the right to privacy was another way in which 
he promoted the right to be left alone29. However, the Right to Privacy has been developed 
in various cases belonging to the Jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
in which a range of values has been found in which they have been assigned a certain degree 
of protection. Therefore, before entering the Right to Data Protection in the United States 
and the European Union, it is necessary to understand how the concept of privacy in the 
United States evolved until it was recognized as a right. 
 
1.1.1.1 Olmstead v. the United States. 
 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) occurred in 1927 and began to lay the 
foundations for the development of the right to privacy in the United States. This case proved 
to have been incredibly valuable and influential in future decisions in cases of the United 
States. 
 
In the 1920s and later, there was a ban on the sale of alcoholic beverages that increased the 
federal government's role in the prosecution and combat of crime, and also increased the 
work of federal courts30. The increase in work in federal courts brought unexpected demands 
towards the federal government due to the ban, and the role of government in the daily life 
of citizens begins to be raised. This increase in the prosecution of criminals brought with it 
new methods that were used by the government to justify the demands presented to federal 
courts, and even to the supreme court, among them was the wiretapping of phones that 
provoked constitutional questions of difficult resolution31. 
 
Olmstead operated business of clandestine alcohol sales or better called bootlegging, which 
 
29 Warren, Brandeis, supra note 3. 
30 Hamm, R. F. (2010). Olmstead v. United States: The Constitutional Challenges of Prohibition Enforcement. 
University at Albany, SUNY, Edited by the Federal Judicial Center for inclusion in the project Federal Trials 
and Great Debates in United States History, pp. 1. 
31 Ibid. 
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consisted of the importation of alcoholic beverages from Canada, and was sold throughout 
Seattle, Washington32. In order to gather more evidence about Olmstead's criminal activity, 
federal officials decided to intervene his phone. 
 
The problem was that the obtaining of the recordings through the intervention of Olmstead's 
phones was made without having asked for a warrant. Olmstead defended himself by saying 
that the federal police had violated the rights concerning the fourth and fifth amendments. 
Questions such as, did the use of evidence disclosed in wiretapped private telephone 
conversations, violate the recorded party's Fourth and Fifth Amendments? They are essential 
to realising how the United States judicial system understood the concept of privacy at that 
time. 
 
The Supreme Court in a controversial decision, 5-4 pointed out that the government could 
use the evidence gathered in a criminal trial in a Federal Court since the telephone 
conversation voluntarily made by the accused, and that it was secretly heard due to his 
telephone intervention on the part of the government, it does not cause the accused to be a 
witness against himself in violation of the Fifth Amendment33. 
 
The evidence collected through the intervention of the telephones that were in the Olmstead 
office were carried out in the basement of a building with large offices, and in public streets, 
therefore a trespass was never committed towards the property of the accused. Therefore, 
obtaining these pieces of evidence does not violate the fourth amendment34. In this case, 
Chief Justice William Taft cited previous decisions concerning the fourth amendment in 
which he had applied to physical search and seizure35. 
 
Under the common law system, the admissibility of the evidence is not affected even when 
it has been obtained illegally36. 
 
 
32 Ibid. 
33 Olmstead v United States, 277 U.S. 462. 
34 Id. At 466. 
35 Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Amos v. United 
States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); Silverthorne Lumber Co., Inc. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); Weeks v. 
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 467. 
36 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 467. 
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It is interesting to see how the Supreme Court of the United States understood the state 
intervention in private life in the light of the fourth amendment. However, it is vital to 
analyse the dissenting opinion of the judges and precisely that of Associate Justice Louis 
Brandeis. He pointed out that in Ex parte Jackson37, it was argued that a sealed letter 
entrusted to the mail is protected by the amendments, in this sense, the mail is a public 
service furnished by the government. The telephone is a public service furnished by its 
authority. Therefore, if we refer to its essence, there is no difference between a sealed letter 
and a private telephone conversation 38 . The invasion of the privacy of a telephone 
conversation is a much superior to the invasion of a letter since when the privacy of a 
telephone conversation is invaded, the private life of two people is invaded, while the 
invasion of one sealed letter only implies the invasion of a person's privacy. 
 
The protection of the fourth and fifth amendments did not apply. It is possible to understand 
that no physical intrusion was carried out at the time of the telephone intervening, but the 
experience should teach us to protect our freedom. Men are born free and must be alerted to 
repel any invasion of freedom by an evil-mind ruler. In this case, the decision should be 
reversed, since the telephone intervention is a crime contained in the laws of Washington39. 
 
The information obtained by the intervention of Olmstead's phones was made by federal 
officials acting on their own. The Eighteenth Amendment has not authorised anyone to 
violate the criminal laws of a state. No one gave the authority to these officers to intervene 
in these telephone lines, so these officers should assume a criminal sanction, but the 
government is morally responsible since it became aware of what its officers were doing40. 
 
The dissenting opinion of Justice Louis Brandeis implies that the founding fathers of the 
United States have conferred in their amendments a right to leave them alone, which is one 
of the rights that favours civilised men. The government should not violate the laws of the 
states to gather evidence that solves a case. This case shows a seed regarding the rights of 
citizens against illegal interventions by the Government. It is not possible to understand the 
illegal action of the government since it interferes in the private life of people without a just 
 
37 Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878). 
38 Olmstead, 277 U.S. 475. 
39 Id. At 479. 
40 Id. At 482-483. 
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cause, and without any rule, that enables it to do so. 
 
1.1.1.2 Poe v. Ullman. 
 
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 81 S. Ct. 1752 (1961). The facts of the case can be synthesized 
in the following, Paul and Pauline Poe, was a young married couple, who live together and 
have no children. Pauline Poe had had three consecutive pregnancies that had ended with 
infants with multiple congenital abnormalities, and who had died promptly after birth, so 
she had decided to use contraceptive methods to prevent a fourth pregnancy. Another woman, 
in this case, Jane Doe, does not have any children, but she had recently been pregnant which 
caused her a deep state of physical discomfort, in which she had a period of 2 weeks 
unsettled, and a total of 9 weeks sick what it caused her a paralysis that caused her difficulties 
to speak, and emotional instability. Another pregnancy, in this case, would be very harmful 
to her, and therefore decides to seek a contraceptive method to prevent a second pregnancy 
that could be a threat to her life41. 
 
The women in both cases sought that the damage they had suffered would not occur again 
in the future. The form of prevention is through contraceptives, but unfortunately, during 
that time, Connecticut's law42 prohibited doctors from facilitating contraceptive devices and 
giving information about them. Finally, the two women and their doctor decide to file a 
lawsuit s against the States Attorney, Ullman, claiming that the law violated their Fourteenth 
Amendment rights to due process. 
 
Questions such as did the Connecticut law violate liberty protected by due process of the 
Fourteenth Amendment? Started to arise. The problematic of this case depended on a 
straightforward application of the law. The judges in the first instance dismissed the 
plaintiffs' lawsuit since the law was in the books, but it was not being applied during that 
time. 
 
The Supreme Court when it received the case, determined that there had been no violation 
of the right to due process of the plaintiffs since the law only posed a threat to the plaintiffs, 
 
41 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 498-500 (1961). 
42 Conn. Public Acts 1879, c. 78. 
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but in this case, the law was not being applied43. Therefore, the freedom contained in the 
fourteenth amendment had not been violated. 
 
The law had been in effect for almost 100 years44, and it had never been applied. The judges 
decided to resolve with a sense of urgency and did not consider whether or not there was a 
violation of the constitution. 
 
However, although the Supreme Court did not want to go into details about the violation or 
not of an amendment, for this particular case, it is necessary to pay attention to the dissenting 
opinion, and especially that of Justice John Marshall Harlan II. The underlying reason for 
the dissenting opinion is to go around the definition of the “Right to Privacy”. Justice John 
Marshall Harlan II seeks to question the authority of the state of Connecticut whenever it 
intends to invade the private life of a couple. 
 
“Here is the core of my disagreement with the present disposition. As I will develop later in 
this opinion, the most substantial claim which this married person press is their right to enjoy 
the privacy of their marital relations, free of the enquiry of the criminal law, whether it be 
in the prosecution of them or of a doctor whom they have consulted. And I cannot agree that 
their enjoyment of this privacy is not substantially impinged upon when they are told that if 
they use contraceptives, indeed whether they do so or not, the only thing which stands 
between them and being forced to render a criminal account of their marital privacy is the 
whim of the prosecutor”45. 
 
In the words of Justice John Marshall Harlan II, Connecticut law is considered to be violating 
the Fourteenth Amendment. It considers that a law that seeks to criminalise the use of 
contraceptive methods by a house couple is an intolerable and unjustifiable invasion of the 
invasion of privacy, something that interferes with one's personal life46. 
 
After the dissenting opinion of Justice John Marshall Harlan II, it is possible to understand 
that he has highlighted the right to privacy and with this new approach a new range of rights 
 
43 Poe, 367 U.S. at 510. 
44 Id. At 501. 
45 Id. At 536 
46 Id. At 539 
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for people in the United States. 
 
1.1.1.3 Griswold v. Connecticut. 
 
Griswold v. State of Connecticut was a court case decided by the United States Supreme 
Court in 1965. 
 
The case was initially favourable to the plaintiff, which in this case is the state of Connecticut. 
Estelle Griswold, who was the director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, 
and Lee Buxton, the Medical Director of the same organisation, were sentenced as accessory 
perpetrators of the crime for providing couples with information about contraceptive 
methods, and in some cases writing a prescription for contraceptive devices for women47. 
 
The arrest of these people occurred in 1961, during that period, Connecticut law48 prescribed 
as a crime for anyone who used a drug or device for the purpose of preventing pregnancy 
and prescribed a crime for anyone seeking to attend, advise, cause or order another person 
to do the same. Therefore, Estelle Griswold and Lee Buxton were found guilty of providing 
assistance with contraceptive methods and fined 100 dollars each. 
 
In the Supreme Court ruling, the majority opinion refers to the Connecticut Law regarding 
birth control being unconstitutional regarding the fourth and fifth amendments that protect 
the individual's home and private life from government interference 49 . Marriage is 
something sacred and a private bond between two people that fall on one of the privacy 
spheres guaranteed in several provisions of the constitution, and also the sense of freedom 
found in the Bills of Right. 
 
The decision, in this case, was in charge of Justice William O. Douglas. Justice Douglas's 
opinion, in this case, is that the Bill of Rights has specific guarantees, but they also have 
“penumbras”50 that are created through the emanation of these guarantees to give an opinion 
and meaning. Through the first, third, fourth, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth, it is possible to 
 
47 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
48 Articles 53-32, 54-196 of The General Statutes of Connecticut (1958 rev.) 
49 Griswold, 381 U.S. 484-486. 
50 Id. At 483. 
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build this right to privacy that cannot be infringed51. 
 
Although there are differences in the basis of this ruling on the constitutional category of the 
right to privacy, it is possible to recognize that the right to privacy exists, is fundamental and 
also substantive. 
 
The court understands that people should be free from any state interference that is not 
deemed necessary since the right to privacy is superior to that. “Would we allow the police 
to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for tell-tale signs of the use of 
contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage 
relationship”52. 
 
1.1.1.3 Katz v. the United States. 
 
The case is about Charles Katz, a person who specialized in betting on college basketball. 
His activities caught the attention of The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and therefore 
began to investigate his betting activities. In 1965, Katz was secretly recorded while 
reporting his bets to the bookmakers; the FBI was able to record the entire conversation, as 
they had connected a listening device to one of the telephone booths near his apartment in 
Los Angeles. FBI agents decided to arrest Katz and accused him of transmitting bets through 
the US state telephone lines, which is a crime under federal betting law53 in the United 
States54. 
 
During Katz's trial, his lawyer argued that the telephone booth he used should be considered 
 
51 Id. At 486-493. 
52 Id. At 486. 
53 18 U.S.C. § 1084. That statute provides in pertinent part: 
"(a) Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering knowingly uses a wire communication 
facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the 
placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the transmission of a wire communication 
which entitles the recipient to receive money or credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for information assisting 
in the placing of bets or wagers, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, 
or both." 
"(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of 
information for use in news reporting of sporting events or contests, or for the transmission of information 
assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on a sporting event or contest from a State where betting on that 
sporting event or contest is legal into a State in which such betting is legal." 
54 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) 
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an area constitutionally protected by the Fourth Amendment of the United States. Therefore, 
all recordings obtained by the FBI should be excluded as evidence of the trial, since the FBI 
had never requested a search warrant that allowed them to place the listening device in the 
telephone booth55. 
 
The judge rejected this argument, and therefore Charles Katz was convicted based on the 
recordings obtained as evidence. Finally, Katz decided to appeal this ruling and therefore 
addressed the Supreme Court of the United States. 
 
The main question that we must ask ourselves in order to fully understand this case is, the 
Fourth Amendment gives us protection against unreasonable searches and seizures by the 
government and therefore imposes that the government must obtain a search warrant to do 
so, but It is necessary to obtain a search warrant, whenever it is intended to intercept a public 
telephone booth?56 
 
On December 18, 1967, the Supreme Court of the United States in a 7-1 decision favourably 
sentenced Charles Katz that invalidated the FBI's wiretap, and therefore reversed the 
sentence against Katz. The ruling was drafted by Justice Potter Stewart, and a series of 
arguments are noted: 
 
Listening activities by the Government of the United States, in particular, FBI agents, had 
violated Katz's privacy while he was using the telephone booth near his apartment, and 
therefore when they did this listening, they constituted a "search and seizure" in a sense 
reflected by the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court judges declare that the spaces 
referring to a public telephone booth cannot be considered a protected constitutional area, 
and also the Fourth Amendment cannot be explicitly translated as a constitutional right to 
the right to privacy57. What the fourth amendment of the United States seeks is to protect 
the individual freedom of people against inevitable intrusions by the Government. The 
judges of the Supreme Court correctly affirm that the intention given by the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States is protection towards people, not places in particular. 
Whenever a person makes a call, what they are looking for is that their conversation is not 
 
55 Id. At 349-350. 
56 Katz v. United States. (n.d.). Oyez. Retrieved April 27, 2020, from https://www.oyez.org/cases/1967/35. 
57 Katz, 389 U.S. 350. 
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heard; therefore, the argument on the part of the Government regarding the glass material of 
the telephone booth is unfounded58. 
 
Now, the United States Government uses the argument used in Olmstead v. United States59 
and Goldman v. United States 60  every time it is argued that the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment is only for tangible property, therefore, in this case, it cannot be applied, 
because there was never a trespass to the property, as noted in “Trespass Doctrine”. It is true 
that the United States justice system has been deciding in this way the cases concerning the 
Fourth Amendment, but the judges well understand that the Fourth Amendment has the 
objective of protecting people, and not specifically physical places of unreasonable searches 
and seizures by the Government. Therefore, the activities of the Government in terms of the 
listeners made in the public telephone booth referring to Katz's conversations constitute a 
search and seizure order, as indicated in the Fourth Amendment61. 
 
Another of the arguments that need to be deepened is the one put forward by Justice John 
Marshall Harlan II. This judge in his concurring opinion indicates 3 types of arguments, the 
first one refers to the fact that a telephone booth (closed) is a private area just like a home62, 
in which any person has a reasonable expectation of privacy that is constitutionally protected; 
the second refers to the fact that the electronic intrusion by the government when placing 
the listening device in a place that is supposed to be private may constitute a violation of the 
fourth amendment; and that the invasion of a constitutional area protected by the FBI is 
allegedly unreasonable in the absence of a search and search order63. 
 
To get more details, when the Supreme Court's opinion points out that the Fourth 
Amendment protects people and not places, Harlan points out that the reference to a place 
had arisen from previous decisions where there was a double requirement, the first 
requirement is that a person has exhibited a real and subjective expectation of privacy, and 
the second requirement is that society considers that expectation of privacy as reasonable64. 
 
58 Id. At 352-353. 
59 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 457, 464, 466. 
60 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-136. 
61 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. 
62 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
63 Katz, 389 U.S. at 360-361. 
64 Id. At 361. 
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In this case, what we are looking to raise is that a person who has a conversation in a public 
place cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy, since that conversation can be 
correctly heard by other people, but if a person wishes to maintain a conversation in a private 
place if it could be understood that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
 
1.2 The reasonable expectation of privacy. 
 
The reasonable expectation of privacy is an elementary element of the privacy laws, and that 
helps determine in which places, moments and activities a person has a right to privacy. 
 
The concept of a "reasonable expectation of privacy" brings with it a series of tests so that 
the reasonable expectation can be determined: 
 
a) First, the person must demonstrate a subjective or psychological element, in which 
he expects his activity, places or moments to be private. 
b) The second has to do with what in society is considered reasonable, that is, that the 
subjective expectation of the individual must be considered reasonable in society65. 
 
People in a society may have a reasonable expectation of privacy when they have 
conversations over the phone and letters. Reasonable expectations may change from society 
to society, for example, the previous case would only apply in the United States, but in the 
case of the European Union, it would be possible to understand that Instant Messaging 
Services are also private, and no one is monitoring them. 
 
Now, people should not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when their actions take 
action in a public space or when their possessions can be seen forever. In the case of privacy 
in electronic media, in the United States, there would be no reasonable expectation of dialled 
numbers, of electronic bank records and of communications maintained through these 
electronic media.66 
 
The cases of a reasonable expectation of privacy mentioned above can be easily solved at 
 
65 68 American Jurisprudence 2d Searches and Seizures §9 (1962). 
66 15B American Jurisprudence 2d Computers and the Internet (1962) §28. 
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the time of contrast. However, if we take privacy expectations to a modern environment, it 
is difficult to understand what is understood as public space, and what is understood by a 
private sphere. What the author of this thesis intends to point out is that historically the 
judicial system of the United States has always had to look at the fourth amendment of its 
constitution to find some kind of privacy protection, and it has been interpreted in different 
ways. The protection of privacy from the beginning could be understood as the right to leave 
you alone, protection of the home, freedom from government surveillance, etc. However, 
there is no law in the United States that seeks privacy protection nationally. 
 
The courts of the United States continue to apply the same logic for the resolution of cases, 
using legal precedents that are unable to solve new cases concerning the digital world in 
which we live. 
 
It is understandable that the creation of a reasonable expectation of privacy in Katz v. United 
States has reflected a thought of how privacy was understood in the years 1967, but the 
author of this thesis thinks that the lack of initiative by the United States Congress to legislate 
on a national law that seeks the Privacy protection of individuals, to have had to be results 
with the effort of the judiciary. 
 
Later the author of this thesis will develop this idea in-depth, but first, it is necessary to delve 
into the idea of the third-party doctrine and how it was developed. 
 
1.3 The third-party doctrine. 
 
The third-party doctrine is a legal doctrine that is part of the legal system of the United States, 
and that in simple terms maintains that people who voluntarily decide to deliver information 
to third parties (whatever the service) do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy67. 
This allows the Government of the United States to obtain information from a person by 
going to these third parties without a legal warrant and without complying with the 
prohibition established in the fourth amendment of the Constitution of the United States. 
 
 
67 See Issacharoff, L.; Wirsha, K. (2016). Restoring reason to the third-party doctrine. Minnesota Law Review, 
100(3), 985-1050; Gentithes, M. (2020). App permissions and the third-party doctrine. Washburn Law Journal, 
59(1), 35-52; Kerr, O. S. (2009). The case for the third-party doctrine. Michigan Law Review, 107(4), 561-602. 
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The United States Fourth Amendment does not prohibit information voluntarily disclosed 
to a third party, and obtained by government authorities, from being used, even if the 
information was voluntarily disclosed in the belief that it will only be used for the purpose 
collected and that the trust that has been placed in that third part will not be undermined68. 
 
1.3.1 The United States v. Miller. 
 
The case deals with Mitch Miller who was sentenced for running an alcohol distillery 
business, was caught carrying necessary equipment for the alcohol distillery, and bottles of 
whiskey on which the alcohol tax had not been paid69. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and 
Firearms (ATF) issued subpoenas to two of Miller's banks asking for records of all Mitch 
Miller account transactions. The evidence collected by the AFT was used in the trial against 
Miller in which he was sentenced in the first instance, but the United States Court of Appeals 
reversed that ruling, stating that Miller's rights under the United States Fourth Amendment 
had been violated. 
 
The case was brought to the United States Supreme Court in which the overriding question 
to answer was whether the records obtained from Miller's accounts constituted a violation 
of the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that the bank records obtained by the AFT were 
not under the protection of the Fourth Amendment, and therefore the District Court had not 
erred in its judgment in denying the motion to repress70. The court held: 
 
a) That the records seized were not Miller's private papers, but records of the businesses 
that banks regularly use71. 
b) It is not possible to find a legitimate expectation of privacy in the content of the 
deposit vouchers and checks since they are commercial instruments used in 
commercial transactions and not confidential communication mechanisms72. The 
seized documents are information that is voluntarily transmitted to banks and their 
employees to naturally conduct a business 73 . The fourth amendment does not 
 
68 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
69 Id. At 435. 
70 Id. At 440-446. 
71 Id. At 440-441. 
72 Id. At 441-443. 
73 Ibid. 
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prohibit the collection of information disclosed to a third party and transmitted by 
that third party to a government authority74. 
 
1.3.2 Smith v. Maryland. 
 
This case is about installing a pen register to record the numbers dialled from Smith's home 
phone. This installation was made at the request of the police in order to gather information 
about a theft case. Smith prior to the robbery trial, asked to suppress any result from the pens 
because it violated his Fourth Amendment right. The Maryland court denied Smith's motion 
arguing that the installation of the pen register did not violate his Fourth Amendment right. 
Smith appealed, but the Court of Appeals upheld the judgment issued by the Maryland 
Court75. 
 
The United States Supreme Court held that the installation and use of a ballpoint pen 
registration did not constitute a search under the terms contained in the Fourth Amendment 
and therefore it was not a requirement to obtain a warrant from the police to carry out said 
operation76. The arguments were: 
 
a) The application of Fourth Amendment protection is conditioned on whether the 
applicant seeking its protection can claim a legitimate expectation of privacy that has 
been invaded by some government authority. For this legitimate expectation of 
privacy to operate, two requirements must be met, the first having to do with the fact 
that the individual must have exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy, and the 
second requirement is that the subjective expectation of the subject is a reasonable 
expectation within a society77. 
b) In this case, Smith did not have a subjective expectation of privacy over the phone 
numbers he dialled, and even if he did, his expectation could not be considered 
legitimate. The court's argument states that phone users should have a general 
expectation of privacy regarding the numbers they dial as they should be transmitted 
 
74 Ibid. 
75 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
76 Id. At 739-746. 
77 Id. At 739-741; Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967). 
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to the phone company and the phone company should have the facility to record this 
information, record for commercial purposes, etc.; Smith was unable to demonstrate 
this expectation using his home phone as he could have used a public phone. 
Furthermore, this subjective expectation cannot be considered reasonable within a 
society since Smith voluntarily transmitted the numerical information to the 
telephone company78. 
 
With the cases of United States v. Miller and Smith v. Maryland establishes the third-party 
doctrine which has been used countless times by the United States Courts to determine the 
extent of protection of the Fourth Amendment regarding privacy. This doctrine states that 
persons who voluntarily provide information to a third party are not protected by an 
expectation of privacy, and therefore government authorities can obtain information without 
the need for a warrant. 
 
The development of the Third-Party doctrine during the 20th century brought with it answers 
to problems posed with the technology of that time. However, it was not possible for the 
judges of the Supreme Court of the United States to imagine the type of technology that 
would exist in the future, today too much data is in the hands of third parties. Recent cases 
of the Supreme Court such as United States v. Jones in which Justice Sonia Sotomayor points 
“People disclose the phone numbers that they dial or text to their cellular providers, the 
URLs that they visit and the e-mail addresses with which they correspond to their Internet 
service providers, and the books, groceries and medications they purchase to online 
retailers… I would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some member of 
the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment 
protection.”79 The Supreme Court applied reasoning similar to that of Justice Sotomayor in 
Riley v. California. The problem is if the government could search the content (data) of a 
cell phone in search of the arrest incident80. The third-party doctrine has remained constant 
throughout the decades. However, the Supreme Court has defined exceptions, for example, 
individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in luggage placed in overhead 
 
78 Smith, 442 U.S. at 736. 
79 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 417 (2012). 
80 Riley v. California - 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480 (2014). 
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compartments on a bus81; in hotel rooms where guests stay, even when there is express 
permission from third parties to access their rooms82. 
 
The fundamental problem that lies in the third-party doctrine is that with technology as 
modern as it exists today, too much data is in the hands of third parties. We must think that 
we live in a digital age in which we store photos and documents with our cloud providers, 
our internet history is in the hands of ISPs, etc. It is no longer necessary for the government 
to enter people's homes to learn from a specific person since all the necessary data is in the 
hands of third parties. Furthermore, it must be remembered that part of the doctrine 
developed in Smith v. Maryland assumed that people were voluntarily providing that 
information to telephone companies. It is not possible to apply this same reason today, 
because it is impossible to think that people chose not to use a phone when technology is so 
immersed in our lives. 
 
However, there is a tendency to rethink the third-party doctrine with the Carpenter case. In 
Carpenter v. Unites States, the United States Supreme Court notes that individuals have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment regarding cell towers that 
disclose information about the location of individuals83. What the Supreme Court holds in 
Carpenter v. United States is of vital importance since, under the third-party doctrine, an 
individual does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, and therefore no protection 
under the Fourth Amendment, on information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. There is 
an essential change in the reasoning of the Supreme Court since it understands that the 
simple fact of using a cell phone, an individual is giving information about his location, in 
which this data is not being voluntarily given84. However, the Supreme Court expressly 
limits the extent of Fourth Amendment protection to CSLI, wasting an opportunity to clarify 
important issues regarding Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in a digital age. Courts of the 
first instance in the United States have refused to interpret the case of Carpenter v. United 
 
81 Bond v. U.S., 529 U.S. 334 (2000). 
82 Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964). 
83 Carpenter v. United States, No. 16-402, 585 U.S. 2215-2216 (2018). 
84 Carpenter, 201 U.S. at 2218. 
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States in a broad way to deal with similar problems85. However, in Naperville Smart Meter 
Awareness v. City of Naperville, No. 16-3766 (7th Cir. 2018) positive signs is given 
indicating that the United States Courts in the near future may build their arguments on the 
basis of Carpenter v. United States for reasons of extending Fourth Amendment protection 
to various types of personal data. 
 
1.2 The right to privacy in the European Union. 
 
Article number 1 of the European Charter of Human Rights indicates “Human dignity is 
inviolable. It must be respected and protected.86” In the European Union, human dignity is 
recognized as an absolute fundamental right. The right to privacy or to live a private life is 
enshrined in article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in article 7 of the 
European Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU Charter) and in article 8 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).  
 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human rights enshrines the right to privacy in the 
European Union. The scope of application of this article falls on 4 identified interests, a) 
private life; b) family life; c) home and d) correspondence. The second part of the article has 
to do with determining if there has been an interference not permitted by law in one of the 
interests mentioned above, or if the state has a positive obligation to protect the right to 
privacy87. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has developed the scope of Article 8 ECHR through 
its jurisprudence, in which there is no definition of private life88, and the term of private life 
is broad89 . Furthermore, its jurisprudence regarding files or data collected by security 
 
85 Cheng, R. (2018). Say the Secret Word: Court Allows Cellphone Search Despite Password Request before 
Miranda Warning. Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/roncheng/2018/08/09/say-the-secret-word-court-
allows-cellphone-search-despite-password-request-before-miranda-warning/#2b2d18af771d  
86 Council of Europe., & Council of Europe. (2000). The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
Art. 1. 
87 European Court of Human Rights. (2019). Guide on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
Right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence. 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_8_ENG.pdf. Pp. 7. 
88 ECtHR 13710/88, Niemietz v. Germany. 
89 ECtHR 44647/98, Peck v. The United Kingdom.  
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services or the state is quite extensive90. 
 
The ECHR was born as a product of the consequences of the Second World War91 and had 
a direct relationship with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights92. Article 8 ECHR was 
drafted in a negative way to promote freedom and prevent illegal interference by states. 
However, through the practice of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Article 8 
ECHR has been interpreted as a right stemming from the personality of the individual, 
promoting the liberties of individuals and forcing states to adopt positive measures to protect 
this right. In the words of van der Sloot, the practice of ECtHR has led to a considerable 
expansion of the scope of the right to privacy93. 
 
A) The right to privacy has been used by ECtHR to grant protection in different matters 
that mainly fall on other rights and freedoms contained in the ECHR, such as the 
right to marriage, the right to a fair trial, and the protection of the reputation of 
people94. 
B) The right to privacy has come to replace the absence of other rights and freedoms 
such as development to develop personality, the right to property, the right to 
residence, and legal identity95. 
C) Article 8 ECHR has been the main argument under which the ECtHR has built its 
jurisprudence and has opened the ECHR to new rights and freedoms, such as the 
right to data protection, minority rights, and the right to clean and healthy 
environment96. 
 
As for the recognition of the right to data protection, there is no problem, since it is possible 
to refer to article 8 EU Charter. Furthermore, the right to privacy, together with the right to 
 
90 ECtHR 33810/07, Association “21 December 1989” and Others v. Romania; ECtHR 27798/95, Amann v. 
Switzerland; ECtHR 9248/81, Leander v Sweden; ECtHR 7215/75, X v. United Kingdom; ECtHR 74336/01, 
Beteiligungen GmbH v. Austria. 
91 Weil, G. L, & Goodrich, L. M. (1963). The European convention on human rights: background, development 
and prospects. Leyden: Sythoff. 
92 United Nations, supra note 8, preamble. 
93 van der Sloot, B., (2015). Privacy as Personality Right: Why the ECtHR’s Focus on Ulterior Interests Might 
Prove Indispensable in the Age of “Big Data”. Utrecht Journal of International and European Law, 31(80), 
pp.25–50. 
94 Id. Chapter 2. 
95 Id. Chapter 3. 
96 Id. Chapter 4. 
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data protection, are dealt with in different articles in the EU Charter. Therefore, it is possible 
to argue that based on the EU Charter Right to Privacy and Right to Data Protection are 
independent each other. Finally, the right to privacy is enshrined in both Article 8 ECHR 
and Article 7 EU Charter. 
 
Regarding the right to data protection enshrined in Article 8 EU Charter maintains that all 
people have the right to the protection of their personal data and that the processing of that 
data must be fair and with specific purposes based on consent. of the person or other 
legitimate basis prescribed by law. It also maintains that this right guarantee access to said 
data that has been collected regarding him and they have the right to be rectified97. The right 
to data protection in Europe is protected by articles 8 EU Charter, article 8 ECHR, the 
regulation (EU) 2016/679, better known as the General Data Protection Regulation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
97 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER II. THE RIGHT TO DATA PROTECTION IN THE US AND 
EU 
 
It is possible to understand that there is no legislation concerning the protection of data in 
the United States, but many laws that have been drawn up both at the federal and state levels. 
Besides, this right is not widely developed in the laws when compared to the European 
Union98. 
 
The United States lacks a comprehensive and straightforward regulatory framework in 
which both citizens and companies understand the regulation of the collection and in 
addition to the use of this personal data. The United States Congress every time it has tried 
to regulate the protection of data has only regulated specific sectors, such as data concerning 
the health or privacy of children, but has not created single legislation regarding the 
protection of personal data that are intended to protect the privacy of United States citizens, 
and that put an end to the problem between state and federal laws regarding data protection. 
 
2.1 The right to data protection derived from the right to privacy. 
 
The right to privacy in the United States has been discussed on countless occasions, but it is 
possible to point out that the Right to Privacy as such began to be discussed after the 
publication of the article99 written by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in which it is 
discussed the Right to Privacy as a "right to be let alone". After this event, the recognition 
of this right has evolved from the problems that may arise from the private sphere of people 
to the problems that may arise in much more contemporary society. Other authors point out 
that after reviewing various cases of the right to privacy in the United States and the 
definitions proposed by the academies, the right to privacy could be defined as: 
“The right to privacy is our right to keep a domain around us, which includes all those things 
that are parts of us, such as our body, home, thoughts, feelings, secrets and identity. The 
 
98  Frontier Technology. (2015). The differences between EU and US data laws. Frontier Technology.  
https://www.frontiertechnology.co.uk/differences-between-eu-and-us-data-laws/  
99 Warren, Brandeis, supra note 3. 
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right to privacy enables us to choose which parts in this domain can be accessed by others, 
and control the extent, manner and timing of the use of those parts we choose to disclose.”100 
 
In this definition of the Right to Privacy, it is already possible to find nuances that have 
reference to a Right to Data Protection, in which the subjects of law have the right to control 
what type of personal information can be accessed by other people, to have control of what 
type of information is shared with other people, and to what extent this information is shared. 
The social and historical framework in which the society of the United States and the entire 
world is extremely different from what Warren and Brandeis could have imagined. Social 
relations between people are subject to a type of communication and information exchange 
in which everything depends on technology. Technology is continuously developing, and 
society today is part of one of transmission of data and information that generates a constant 
threat to people's private lives. The law must be at the service of social changes, and mainly 
on how technology affects our lives. Laws have encountered several difficulties in protecting 
people's private lives since there is always a duality between protecting people's private lives 
and disclosing personal information to third parties. 
 
Another perspective is suggested by the authors Tessaro and Trojani, in which they suggest 
that there is a deep connection between the concepts of freedom, equality, democracy, 
dignity and privacy in which the concept of the Right to Privacy cannot be considered as a 
"right to be left alone."101 In this case, we see ourselves in a process in which the transition 
from the understanding of the initial concept of the Right to Privacy as a "right to be left 
alone" has changed to a right in which people are in control of their personal data, and also 
has influenced the procedures of the subjects that operate with this data. The society of the 
United States and the world has evolved, and with it, the right to privacy has also done so. 
The right to privacy has evolved to such an extent that it is considered as part of a 
fundamental right for subjects who belong to a society. Therefore, today there are new risks 
associated with the concentration of personal information in the hands of public or private 
institutions in which the risk to be disclosed is high, which is why the right to personal data 
protection derives from the right to privacy. 
 
100 Onn, supra note 7. 
101 Tessaro T., Trojani F. (2006), Privacy e accesso ai documenti nell’Ente locale. Maggioli Editore p. 56. 
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There is no definition of its own in the legislation of the United States that indicates what is 
understood by the right to personal data protection; however, the European Union Charter 
of Fundamental Right in its article 8 indicates: 
 
“1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her. 
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent 
of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the 
right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have 
it rectified. 
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority.”102 
The right to data protection is possible to define it as a right designed to protect a person's 
personal information, the right grants self-determination to the person in whom the subject 
of rights is informed and has the right to decide what type of personal information is willing 
to share with others. This right is of the utmost importance as it seeks to protect the rights 
and freedoms of the subject of rights from possible discrimination based on their religious 
beliefs, their opinions, their health, etc. 
 
The European case differs entirely from the United States case. In the United States 
Constitution, there is no explicit reference to privacy or data protection, while in the 
European case, there is an explicit mention at a constitutional level. Article 8 ECHR is quite 
similar to Article 7 EU Charter, which indicates the right to respect for privacy, family life, 
home and communications103. 
 
In the case of the right to data protection, this is contained in article 8 EU Charter, but there 
is no express mention in the ECHR that falls under the jurisdiction of ECtHR. However, the 
ECtHR has extended the scope of Article 8 ECHR to data protection matters to give rise to 
a right to data protection104. Although privacy and the protection of personal data are closely 
 
102 Council of Europe., & Council of Europe. (2000). The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union. Article 8. 
103 CJEU Case 136/79, National Panasonic (UK) Limited v. Commission of the European Communities. paras 
17 et seq. 
104 ECtHR 27798/95, Amann v Switzerland; ECtHR 28341/95, Rotaru v Romania. 
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linked in ECtHR jurisprudence, they should not be treated as identical, since they are two 
completely independent rights. It is true that both rights may coincide in the scope of 
different areas, but as far as personal data processing is concerned in a fair way, or data 
processing with a defined purpose, it is possible to find that these rights are separated. 
 
2.2 The right to data protection as a crucial human right. 
 
There are various human rights treaties in which a Right to Privacy is proclaimed, and it is 
even possible to find treaties in which the Right to Data Protection would be implicit.  The 
protection of the Right to Privacy and its promotion can be found in various international 
treaties such as: 
 
• Article 17 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”); 
• Article 12 Universal Declaration on Human Rights (“UDHR”); 
• Article 14 International Convention on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families (“ICRMW”); 
• Article 16 Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”); 
• Article 8 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (“ECHR”); 
• Article 11 American Convention on Human Rights (“ACHR”) 
 
If the reader of this thesis takes special consideration in each of these articles, it will be 
possible to understand that the rights and freedoms enshrined in these international human 
rights treaties are the inspirational principles behind the laws in relation to data protection. 
In this case, the author of this essay wants to thoroughly analyze the art. 8 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), art.17 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and art. 11 of the 
American Convention of Human Rights (ACHR) 
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Article 17 of ICCPR provides: 
“1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, 
home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. 
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”105 
 
Article 11 of ACHR provides:  
“1. Everyone has the right to have his honour respected and his dignity recognized. 
2. No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life, his 
family, his home, or his correspondence, or of unlawful attacks on his honour or reputation. 
3. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”106 
 
Article 8 of ECHR provides: 
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except 
such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary for a democratic society in the interests 
of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others.”107 
 
All the aforementioned provisions are written in a way that implies a prohibition of 
interference with people's private life, and this interference could be public or private108. In 
addition, there is a respect for private life, but it is clear to point out that the fundamental 
principles of data protection can be found in international treaties concerning Human Rights, 
 
105 United Nations General Assembly. (1966). International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. vol. 999, 
p. 171 article 17. 
106 Organization of American States (OAS). (1969). American Convention on Human Rights, "Pact of San 
Jose". Article 11. 
107 Council of Europe., & Council of Europe. (1952). The European convention on human rights. Strasbourg: 
Directorate of Information. Article 8. 
108 Bygrave L. (2010). Privacy and Data Protection in an International Perspective. Stockholm Institute for 
Scandinavian Law & Lee A Bygrave 2010. Pp 181 
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but especially Article 8 of ECHR, Article 17 of ICCPR and the Article 11 of ACHR would 
have key provisions to understand the rationale behind the Right to Data Protection 
 
2.2.1 Article 11 of the American Convention of Human Rights. 
 
Article 11 of ACHR establishes the Right to Privacy in a manner very similar to that 
established in Article 12 of the UDHR: 
“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the 
protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” 
Article 11 of ACHR stipulates protection of the Right to Private Life and also a protection 
towards the individual of any unlawful attack on its honour or reputation. It is possible to 
determine that in this article the fundamental principles of data protection are found, but at 
the level of application to cases, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) has 
not sufficiently developed the scope of ACHR so that the concept of protection of Data is 
fully incorporated. The decisions of the IACtHR in the matter of Article 11 have been 
concentrated as regards the Right to Privacy, but only based on a violation of privacy through 
a physical intrusion, as were the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
in its first decisions regarding the right to privacy109. Therefore, the IACtHR has not made 
a broad interpretation of the Right to Privacy in relation to the protection of data; instead, its 
failures have embraced the Right to Privacy in a traditional way of interpretation, through 
physical intrusion to people's privacy110. 
 
Article 11 of ACHR has not been developed based on cases by the IACtHR; therefore, it has 
not been possible to develop the Right to Data Protection based on this article. On the other 
hand, the cases developed based on article 17 of ICCPR and article 8 of ECHR have had this 
development and construction, in addition to requiring the implementation of the basic 
principles related to data protection, therefore article 17 of ICCPR and article 8 of ECHR 
 
109 Bygrave, L. (2002). Data Protection Law: Approaching its Rationale, Logic and Limits (Information Law 
Series Set). Kluwer Law International. Ch 7. 
110 IACtHR Judgment of July 6, 2009, Escher et al.v. Brazil.  
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can be considered as instruments with the objective of protecting the data, while article 11 
of ACHR not having this development by the IACtHR cannot have this consideration111. 
 
As there is no development by IACtHR, most South American countries have had to 
promote data protection mechanisms through the habeas data concept. This concept derives 
from the law and is a jurisdictional action that is formally enshrined in the constitution of 
some countries112, and that confirms the existence of the right to any natural or legal person 
to request and obtain the present information about their person, and to request its 
elimination or correction if it were false, incorrect or simply outdated. The regulatory 
framework in Latin America is quite precarious as it only concentrates data protection 
depending on the concept of habeas data. However, it is possible to see a change of 
perspective in some Latin American states such as Uruguay and Argentina in which they 
have requested the evaluation of their legislation regarding the Convention for the protection 
of individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data to the European Union113. 
Although most Latin American countries are actively participating in the global 
transformation in terms of technology, and are adapting their regulations based on new 
advances in technology, it is not possible to point out that there is adequate data protection 
since less than half of the Organization of American States has implemented an adequate 
system of data protection114. 
 
The IACtHR has served as an instrument in the creation of an appropriate atmosphere in 
which the South American states have been informed of the problems related to data 
protection. Moreover, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has written guidelines 
related to the abusive behaviours that private actors can make regarding personal data of 
 
111 Bygrave, supra note 109 at 181. 
112 In Colombia through the Constitutional Court, Law 1266 of 2008, Law 1273 of 2009, Law 1581 of 2012; 
In Uruguay through its Constitution, Law 18.831 of 2008, Decree 232/010. 
113 Organization of American States (OAS). (1969). American Convention on Human Rights, "Pact of San 
Jose". Article 23. 
114 DLA Piper’s Data Protection, Privacy & Security group. (2014). Data Protection Laws of the World 
Handbook. Available at https://www.dlapiperdataprotection.com/  
38 
 
individuals, and also advising states not to arbitrarily interfere in the data it contains. 
personal information115. 
 
2.2.2 Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
 
The analysis of Article 17 of ICCPR is particularly significant since ICCPR is one of the 
treaties concerning Human Rights with the most extended reach, being ratified by more than 
two-thirds of the countries worldwide116. The cases developed based on Article 17, ICCPR 
provides the most unambiguous advances and indicators of the right to privacy in an 
international framework that enshrines the main principles related to data protection. 
 
“As all persons live in society, the protection of privacy is necessarily relative.  However, 
the competent public authorities should only be able to call for such information relating to 
an individual’s private life the knowledge of which is essential in the interests of society as 
understood under the Covenant.    Accordingly, the Committee recommends that States 
should indicate in their reports the laws and regulations that govern authorized interferences 
with private life.”117 
 
“The gathering and holding of personal information on computers, data banks and other 
devices, whether by public authorities or private individuals or bodies, must be regulated by 
law.    Effective measures must be taken by States to ensure that information concerning a 
person’s private life does not reach the hands of persons who are not authorized by law to 
receive, process and use it, and is never used for purposes incompatible with the Covenant.    
In order to have the most effective protection of his private life, every individual should have 
the right to ascertain in an intelligible form, whether, and if so, what personal data is stored 
in electronic data files, and for what purposes.  Every individual should also be able to 
 
115 Canton, S. (2002). The Role of the OAS Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression in Promoting 
Democracy in the Americas. 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 307, 309 pp 312-13. 
116 United Nations General Assembly. (1966). International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. vol. 999, 
p. 171. 
117 United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC). (1988) CCPR General Comment No. 16: Article 17 
(Right to Privacy), The Right to Respect of Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence, and Protection of 
Honour and Reputation. Para 7. 
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ascertain which public authorities or private individuals or bodies control or may control 
their files.  If such files contain incorrect personal data or have been collected or processed 
contrary to the provisions of the law, every individual should have the right to request 
rectification or elimination.”118 
At the 35th International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners 
Privacy: A compass in turbulent World argued that there is international pressure for the 
creation of binding international agreements regarding data protection to safeguard Human 
Rights by protecting the privacy, the personal data and the integrity of the networks in which 
the transparency of the data processing is increased119. This conference resolved to call on 
all governments to defend the adoption of an additional protocol Article 17 of ICCPR, which 
should be based on the standards that have already been developed and enshrined by other 
international conferences and the provision of General Comment No. 16 of ICCPR in order 
to create a global standard applicable to data protection and privacy protection according to 
law120. 
 
Article 17 of ICCPR adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1966 and 
ratified by 173 states121 provides a legal framework for privacy protection. However, it is 
not possible to point out that Article 17 of ICCPR and general comment number 16 of the 
UN Human Rights Committee give an account of extensive protection of the right to data 
protection. In general comment number 16 there is no reference to the fact that special 
categories of personal data should need an exceptional level of protection and much 
harder122; Nor is reference made to the fact that personal data collection should be done in a 
fair manner; nor does it mention that personal data stored must ensure that it is not accessed 
by unauthorized personnel. 
 
118 Id at para 10. 
119 Resolution on anchoring data protection and the protection of privacy in international law. 35th International 
Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners Privacy: A compass in turbulent world. Warsaw, 
23-26 September 2013. 
120 Ibid. 
121 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner. Status of Ratification. Ratification of 18 
International Human Rights Treaties. Available at https://indicators.ohchr.org/.  
122 Special categories of personal data or sensitive personal data refers to the fact that there are certain types of 
personal data that due to their sensitivity, better protection measures should be granted to ensure their 
protection. Among the special categories of data it is possible to find, racial or ethnic origin, political opinions 
religious beliefs or other beliefs of a similar nature, trade union membership, physical or mental health or 
condition, sex life and sexual orientation, generic data and biometric data. 
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The United States ratified ICCPR in 1992123. The United States made 5 reservations to 
ICCPR, which referred to hate speech, capital punishment, the use of "cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment" and the separation of juvenile and adult offenders 124. Finally, the 
Senate added that ICCPR would not be self-executing meaning that it would not act as 
binding law for the courts of the United States125. The Senate clarified the foregoing and 
noted that the ICCPR would not create private causes of action in the United States Courts126. 
This brought criticism from the UN Human Rights Committee pointing out “Such treaties, 
and the Covenant specifically, is not a web of inter-State exchanges of mutual obligations. 
They concern the endowment of individuals with rights.”127 
 
2.2.3 Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
The article of the European Convention on Human Rights has a relatively broad scope in 
terms of data protection128. The development of data protection based on Article 8 ECHR 
has been made based on a case-by-case dynamic, the guarantees that have been found in 
regard to data protection have been related to the particular circumstances of the cases, and 
therefore its general application is difficult. When analyzing the purpose of article 8, it is 
possible to point out that the primary purpose of this article is to protect the subjects of law 
from any arbitrary interference against privacy, family life, home and correspondence made 
by a public authority129. “There shall be no interference by a public authority with the 
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary for a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-
being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
 
123 Thompson, A. (2008). The United States and the ICCPR. SAIS Review of International Affairs 28(2). pp 
105-106. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid.  
126 Senate Executive Report. (1992) No. 102-23 
127 Wippman, D., Dunoff, J. L., & Ratner, S. R. (2006). International Law: Norms, Actors, Process: A Problem-
oriented Approach. (2nd Edition ed.) Aspen Publishers. Pp. 437 
128 ECtHR 9248/81, Leander v. Sweden, §48; ECtHR 27798/95, Amann v. Switzerland, §65; ECtHR 931/13, 
Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland, §§133-138; ECtHR 57375/08, P. and S. v. 
Poland, §130. 
129 ECtHR 588/13, Libert v. France, §§ 40-42. 
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morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 130  The definition 
presented above is the traditional way of presenting a right, as a negative right, and is an 
essential part of the right as demonstrated in Kroon and Others v. the Netherlands $31. 
However, this right also ensures a positive right, in which even private parties must respect 
each other's privacy131. 
 
The court has interpreted Article 8 ECHR considering that this article has two types of 
obligations, one positive and one negative. The negative obligation has to do with what the 
author of this thesis has previously indicated; mainly, the public authorities must refrain 
from interfering with the exercise of this right132. However, states must also have an active 
role in promoting this right (a positive obligation) in this sense there must be a positive 
obligation that is effective when respecting private life, these obligations may be involved 
with making designated measures with the objective of ensuring respect for private life even 
in the sphere of relations between private parties133. What is logical is that with a positive 
obligation, a state can impose a particular behavior through given legislation not only to 
authorities but also to private actors. 
 
As for the right to data protection, Article 8 ECHR began to develop with Leander v. 
Sweden134. In this case, it is analyzed if the collection and retention of personal data by the 
state in secret files can be used for employment vetting purposes; if a subject of rights has 
the right to access these files under the argument of articles 8 or 10 ECHR; and if remedial 
procedures and safeguards were necessary to protect against abuse of state power. In this 
case, it is noted that the storage of the data referring to a person's private life falls within the 
meaning of article 8135. It is now understood that the storage of the data falls on the definition 
of Article 8 ECHR, but now it is necessary to understand what type of data is referred to 
with private life. In Amann v. Switzerland notes that private life comprises two things, the 
 
130 Council of Europe., & Council of Europe. (1952). The European convention on human rights. Strasbourg: 
Directorate of Information. Article 8.2 
131 ECtHR 61496/08, Bărbulescu v. Romania, §§ 108-111. 
132 ECtHR 28341/95, Rotaru v Romania. 
133 ECtHR 5786/08, Söderman v. Sweden. 
134 ECtHR 9248/81, Leander v Sweden. 
135 Id. at §48. 
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first has to do with the right to live a private life, far from unwanted attention, and second 
the right to establish and develop relationships with other human beings136. 
 
Now as for the personal data that is already in the public domain, in Satakunnan 
Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland, a case in which a publication of 
information about individuals’ taxable incomes and assets in a journal. Given the 
circumstances of the case, the right to privacy that is contained in art 8 ECHR, the court has 
repeatedly stated that the concept of private life is a broad concept that is not susceptible to 
an exhaustive definition. Therefore, the fact that the information is already in the public 
domain does not necessarily mean that the protection granted in article 8 disappears137. 
“Where there has been a compilation of data on a particular individual, processing or use of 
personal data or publication of the material concerned in a manner or degree beyond that 
normally foreseeable, private life considerations arise.138” 
 
Article 8 ECHR has been extensively developed by the European Court of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg, which contains the right to privacy but has given rise to a right to data protection 
too139. There are other international treaties such as Article 8 of The Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union that indicates the existence of the right to personal data 
protection explicitly, but since there is no express recognition of the right to data protection 
in ECHR, the Strasbourg court has had to develop this right through an extensive 
interpretation of the right to privacy. The concept of private life cannot be interpreted 
restrictively since the concept of privacy cannot be encompassed through an exhaustive 
definition. The Court of Justice of the European Union located in Luxembourg has 
interpreted the jurisprudence by the European Court of Human Rights regarding the concept 
 
136 ECtHR 27798/95, Amann v. Switzerland, §65. 
137 See more in ECtHR 40660/08 and 60641/08, Von Hannover v. Germany. The case is about taking a picture 
of a known character in a public place. The court noted that the publication of those photographs must be 
compared with the interest in privacy that person has, even knowing that the fact of appearing in public can be 
assimilated as public information. 
138 ECtHR 931/13, Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland, §136 
139 See more in ECtHR 27798/95, Amann v Switzerland, para. 65; ECtHR 28341/95, Rotaru v Romania, para 
43. 
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of private life, the protection of personal data would be found in this concept, and would be 
defined as any information that made it identifiable or served to identify a person140. 
 
There is a clear distinction regarding the right to data protection when comparing the 
European Union and the United States. In the European Union, there is an explicit 
recognition of the right to privacy and the right to data protection, established at a 
constitutional level, and at the same time in the European Convention on Human Rights and 
the Carter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. However, it is not possible to find 
such protection in the constitution of the United States since there is no express mention of 
the right to privacy or the right to data protection. 
 
2.3 The right to data protection in the US legal system. 
 
The United States does not have a unified legislative regulation in terms of data protection 
but instead follows a sectoral model in terms of its protection. There is no federal or national 
legislation that seeks privacy protection or personal data protection. On the other hand, in 
Europe, it is possible to find another type of approach since there is an exhaustive regulation 
regarding data protection141. The United States is primarily dependent on a combination of 
federal, state and a series of self-regulatory guidelines for specific industries to ensure the 
protection of the data of residents of the United States. 
 
The privacy protection system in the United States is guaranteed through various instruments 
and case law, and they are also applied only to various industries in the United States142. 
When comparing this type of regulation with the regulation contained within the European 
system, at first sight, it would be possible to argue that the European regulation provides a 
much more robust data protection system than the United States data protection system. 
 
140 CJEU, Joined Cases C–92/09 and C–93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke and ECR I-11063, Eifter, para. 52. 
141 European Parliament and of the Council of Europe. (2016). Regulation (EU) 2016/679 n the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation). 
142 See more in Public Law 104–191, “Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996”; 20 U.S. 
Code § 1232g, “Family educational and privacy rights”; 5 U.S.C. § 552a, “Records maintained on individuals”; 
Public Law 107-347, “The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002”. 
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However, authors such as Swire and Kennedy-Mayo143 point out that the data protection 
system in the United States is more stringent than Europe's protection system in 8 ways: 
 
“(1) oversight of searches by independent judicial officers; (2) probable cause of a crime as 
a relatively strict requirement for both physical and digital searches; (3) even stricter 
requirements for government use of telephone wiretaps and other realtime interception; (4) 
the exclusionary rule, preventing prosecutors’ use of evidence that was illegally obtained, is 
supplemented by civil suits; (5) other legal standards that are relatively strict for government 
access in many non-search situations, such as the judge-supervised “reasonable and 
articulable suspicion” standard under ECPA; (6) transparency requirements, such as notice 
to the service provider of the legal basis for a request; (7) lack of data retention requirements 
for Internet communications; and (8) lack of limits on the use of secure encryption.144” 
 
Data protection as such is possible to find in the United States since 1970 with the 
promulgation of Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)145. It is federal government legislation 
enacted with the objective of promoting justice, privacy and the accuracy of consumer 
information contained in the archives of consumer reporter agencies. It aims to impose limits 
on data that can be shared according to the consumer credit report industry, and mainly to 
allow an easy way for consumers to rectify errors in their reports146. In 1974, the United 
States Privacy Act was enacted147, a federal law that establishes a code of conduct regarding 
the practice of fair information that the United States government collects, maintains, uses 
and disseminates personally identifiable information (PII) about individuals and that is kept 
in the system of records of federal agencies. The new act declares that the right to privacy is 
a personal and fundamental right protected by the United States Constitution148. 
If the data protection system of the United States is compared with the data protection system 
of Europe, it is possible to point out that the European system is the role model for the 
 
143 Swire, P., Kennedy-Mayo, D. (2016). How Both the EU and the U.S. Are ‘Stricter’ Than Each Other for 
the Privacy of Government Requests for Information. 66 Emory Law Journal 617 (2016). 
144 Id. At 642 
145 15 U.S.C. § 1681, “Congressional findings and statement of purpose”. 
146 Id. 
147 5 U.S.C. § 552a, “Records maintained on individuals” 
148  Raul, A., Manoranjan. T., Mohan, V. (2015). THE PRIVACY, DATA PROTECTION, AND 
CYBERSECURITY LAW REVIEW. Law Business Research Ltd, London. pp 268-269. 
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protection of the data of individuals, while the approach that has been taken in the United 
States is aimed at protecting consumers149. In the United States, at the federal level is the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) empowered through the Federal Trade Commission Act 
(FTCA)150, the agency responsible for bringing the application of actions that are intended 
to protect consumers from unfair practices by the industry and the application is of federal 
regulations regarding privacy and data protection. The Privacy Act in the United States is a 
breakthrough in terms of Congress's commitment to the right to privacy and the right to data 
protection, however, to this day the United States lacks a comprehensive system. 
 
2.4 The right to data protection in the European Union. 
 
The right to data protection is explicitly enshrined in the treaties of the European Union and 
in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU Charter). 
 
“Article 8. Protection of personal data 
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or ger. 
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the 
consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. 
Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or 
her, and the right to have it rectified. 
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent 
authority.”151 
 
It is also possible to find an express mention of the right to data protection in article 16 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
 
“Article 16. 
1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning them. 
2. The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure, shall lay down the rules relating to the protection of individual 
 
149 McGeveran, W. (2016). Friending the Privacy Regulators. 58 ARIz. L. REV. 959. Pp 961. 
150 15 U.S. Code § 41. “Federal Trade Commission established; membership; vacancies; seal”. 
151 Council of Europe., & Council of Europe. (2000). The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union. Article 8. 
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with regard to the processing of personal data by Union institutions, bodies, offices 
and agencies, and by the Member States when carrying out activities which fall 
within the scope of Union law, and the rules relating to the free movement of such 
data. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to the control of independent 
authorities.”152 
 
One of the fundamental differences between the EU Charter and other treaties on Human 
Rights is that the EU Charter treats the Data Protection Law as an independent right, while 
the other treaties treat the Right to Data Protection as a derivation of the Right to Privacy153. 
However, there are certain peculiarities regarding the proclamation of this right to data 
protection, since it is possible to go back to 1995 when Europe promulgated the European 
Data Protection Directive154, but no reference was made to the Right to Data Protection. 
Everything points to the fact that the Right to Data Protection was proclaimed based on 
Article 286 EC, The Data Protection Directive, Article 8 ECHR and Convention number 
108 of the Council of Europe155. 
 
There are theories as to why the Right to Data Protection was introduced as a separate right 
to the Right to Privacy in the EU Charter. The authors Rouvroy and Poullet consider that the 
reason why the right to data protection was included in the EU Charter was for the purpose 
of extending the protection of the set of data protection rules to areas where there had not 
been covered by the Data Protection Directive156. This seems to be a correct consideration 
since it is possible to extend the scope of protection of a norm through the express 
recognition of a fundamental right. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty157 in 2009 
brought with it the configuration of the Right to Data Protection as an autonomous right. 
 
The elevation of personal data protection to a category of Fundamental Rights of the 
 
152 European Union. (2007). the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Article 16. 
153 Lynskey, O. (2014). Deconstructing data protection: The added-value of right to data protection in the EU 
legal order. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 63(3). Pp 570. 
154  European Union. (1995). Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such 
Data. 
155 Lynskey, supra note 153. 
156 Rouvroy A., Poullet Y. (2009). The Right to Informational Self-Determination and the Value of Self-
Development: Reassessing the Importance of Privacy for Democracy. In: Gutwirth S., Poullet Y., De Hert P., 
de Terwangne C., Nouwt S. (eds) Reinventing Data Protection?. Springer, Dordrecht. 
157 European Union. (2007). the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Article 16.  
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European Union brings with it an important decision by the legislator to reinforce the 
adequate protection of personal data of individuals in the European Union. However, prior 
to the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, European Union legislation based its protection 
of personal data on fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals, and above all on Article 
8 of the European Convention on Human Rights158. In addition to article 8 ECHR, we find 
the Data Protection directive adopted in 1995 that comes to protect the fundamental rights, 
freedoms and privacy of individuals in relation to personal data processing159. 
 
With the Lisbon Treaty, the form of protection of the Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union was redefined, granting that the European Charter of Human Rights has the same 
value as the treaties of the European Union. This brought with it the development and 
improvement of the Charter's legal status, but also uncertainties regarding the role the 
Charter plays in relation to other sources of fundamental rights protections relevant to the 
legal system of the European Union, and the interpretation of the new protective architecture 
of the European Union160. 
 
Apart from the EU Charter and other international treaties, it is possible to find regulation 
focused on the digital age. In the European Union, there is Regulation 2016/679161 focused 
on the protection of natural persons regarding the processing of their personal data, and the 
transfers of personal data. On May 25, 2018, the 2016/679 regulation, better known as the 
General Data Protection Regulation, came into effect. The new regulation brought with it a 
series of modifications regarding the processing of personal data and also replacement of 
the old Data Protection Directive 65/46/EC. GDPR is a regulation that is thinking about the 
regulation of privacy in a digital age, in which people will have the option to grant 
permission to companies to use their data. 
 
 
158 Council of Europe., & Council of Europe. (2000). The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union. 
159  European Union. (1995). Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such 
Data. Article 1. (1), Article 1 (2). 
160 González, G., Gellert, R. (2012). The fundamental right of data protection in the European Union: in search 
of an uncharted right. International Review of Law, Computers & Technology, 26:1. Pp 73-82 
161 European Parliament and of the Council of Europe. (2016). Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation). 
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The most notable changes it brought with it were: 
 
A) “The fines imposed under the GDPR law ranges up to 20 million Euros or 4% (four 
per cent) of the company’s annual turnover;  
B) The actions initiated against the violators and the compensation awarded to the 
victims of a data breach; 
C) The control over personal data; and  
D) The expanded jurisdiction of the law even on the companies incorporated outside the 
EU and doing business with companies inside the EU.162” 
 
The fundamental difference between the old data protection law in the European Union and 
the GDPR is that the old law only regulated institutions that were within Europe and its 
member states, but the GDPR also affects companies that are incorporated outside of Europe, 
therefore represents a radical change in the game scheme. This brought with it a new way in 
which data processing should be handled outside of the European Union. The subjects that 
are bound by GDPR will have to evaluate the risks that the processing of the data supposes 
and, in the cases, that there is a higher risk they will have to prepare data protection impact 
assessments (DPIAs)163. They will have to implement systems that are capable of responding 
to all requests that arise based on the rights conferred by GDPR on its users164. and many 
more other requirements that have the objective of returning control to individuals over their 
personal data and simplifying the regulatory environment for international business165. This 
means that companies established in countries with more flexible data protection regulations 
will have to educate themselves and adopt more rigorous mechanisms to protect personal 
data in order to comply with the requirements imposed by GDPR. 
 
In a particular case, companies that are established in the United States will have to approach 
the protection of personal data in a different way if it is personal data from the European 
 
162 Ganotra, S. (2018). Gdpr compliant or not. Court Uncourt | STA Law Firm: Volume V Issue VI. pp 2-4. 
163 European Parliament and of the Council of Europe. (2016). Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation). Article 35. 
164 Id at Article 15-20. 
165 Council of the European Union. (2015). 9565/15, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation). Available at 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9565-2015-INIT/en/pdf  
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Union. The expansive effect that GDPR has and that reaches companies in the United States 
makes us rethink the protection granted by the American legislation, and therefore look for 
other protection mechanisms to guarantee more excellent protection to individuals residing 
in the United States. 
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CHAPTER III. EU INFLUENCE ON DATA PROTECTION IN THE US 
MODEL 
 
3.1 Why the European Union model has influenced the international scene. 
 
The model of the European Union, which is characterized by providing a complete set of 
rules ready to regulate and protect personal data and also grant and guarantee rights of action 
to its holders. The European Union model seems to be suitable in the sense that regulation 
(EU) 2016/679 seeks the protection of natural persons regarding the processing of their 
personal data and the free movement of that data. Furthermore, regulation is seen as a 
fundamental step in strengthening the fundamental rights of individuals in a globalized, 
digital society and that facilitates business activity by clarifying the rules to create a unique 
digital market166. 
 
Some laws worldwide have implemented a similar approach to that regulated by the General 
Data Protection Regulation167. Legislation around the world is seeking to resemble the 
European model, but it is necessary to ask why the European model is considered the 
standard to follow. There is no doubt that there is a primary need for regulating the protection 
of personal data at the international level. The attempts so far have been the Convention 
108168 established by the Council of Europe and the Privacy Guidelines169 issued by the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
 
The document issued in 1980170 and then updated in 2013171 sets out the basic principles 
that national legislation should have such as a) Collection Limitation Principle; b) Data 
 
166  European Commission. Data protection in the EU. European Commission. Available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/data-protection-eu_en  
167 See Lei Nº 13.709, (14th of August 2018). República Federativa de Brasil, that unifies more than 40 
different regulations regarding personal data protection both online and offline. 
168  Council of Europe. (1981). Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data. Council of Europe Treaty Series 108. Strasbourg: Council of Europe. 
169  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. (2013). Recommendation of the Council 
concerning Guidelines governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data. 
170 Ibid. 
171 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. OECD work on privacy. OECD. Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/privacy.htm.  
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Quality Principle; c) Purpose Specification Principle; d) Use Limitation Principle; e) 
Security Safeguards Principle; f) Openness Principle; Individual Participation Principle; and 
Accountability Principle. The previous document contains the fundamental principles 
setting the international standard and which should be adopted by the data protection 
legislation of each country. However, the document lacks a principle that establishes the 
protection of certain specific types of data, such as personal data that is considered sensitive, 
such as data revealing ethnic or racial origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical 
beliefs, genetic data, biometric data processed solely to identify a human being, etc. The 
European Union legislation collects this sensitive personal data and groups it into a specific 
set called "Special data categories.172" The reason for a separate category of this personal 
data is essential. It is not only necessary that companies have a lawful basis for processing 
listed under article 6 of the General Data Protection Regulations, but they must also have a 
legal basis to do it under article 9 GDPR.  The reason for not including a principle of 
protection of sensitive personal data is straightforward. There was a conflict of views 
between the United States and the European Union; the difference is that the United States 
considers that the value of the data is given by the specific context of the data, while the 
European Union considers personal data as sensitive by itself173. 
 
The privacy guidelines issued by the OECD differ from Convention 108 in that the 
Convention was opened for signature during 1981 and was the first binding document 
regarding data protection around the world. The purpose of this convention is that its 
participants are required to adopt the necessary measures to apply its principles and to 
translate them into their legislation with the aim of ensuring respect for the fundamental 
rights of all individuals regarding the processing of personal data. Although Convention 108 
responded to the challenges of its time, the Council of Europe decided to bring the 
Convention into the 21st century and update its protection with the aim of facing the 
challenges imposed by a digital society and the use of new technologies. Among the 
innovations that it brings with it are the principles of proportionality and minimization of 
data; legality of the processing; obligation to declare data breaches; new rights for people in 
 
172 European Parliament and of the Council of Europe. (2016). Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation). Article 9. 
173 Roos, A. (2006). Core principles of data protection law. The Comparative and International Law Journal 
of Southern Africa, 39(1). pp 121-122. 
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an algorithmic decision-making context; accountability of data controllers; etc174. 
 
There are researchers who point out that data privacy laws have been proclaimed in more 
than 124 countries where the vast majority have followed the European standard of 
protection175. In addition, it points out that Convention 108 is an open convention that has a 
European origin, but that any country can apply to access176. There is a trend that hopes that 
Convention 108 has the potential to become the first treaty at an international level that 
promotes data protection, and that also the unique and most effective strategy that the United 
Nations can adopt to strengthen national legislation and the regulatory frameworks regarding 
the collection, processing and use of personal data is to adopt Convention 108177. There is a 
current problem in the international sphere where there is no international regulatory 
framework regarding the protection of personal data, and therefore there is no model to 
follow. This causes countries to look for a unique and unique way of dealing with this 
problem, so there will be discrepancies in the way that data protection is addressed. 
 
Currently, there are 3 models to follow regarding the protection of data privacy. However, 
the author of this thesis will address 2 of them concerning western countries. The author of 
this thesis considers that the European approach to data protection has more robust 
protection towards the fundamental rights and liberties of people in contrast to the American 
approach that seems to lack this protection. The US model in terms of data protection seems 
to have a less protective role compared to the European model since it lacks a comprehensive 
national data protection law, and in addition, the different laws established regarding data 
protection are found distributed in the different states that make up its territory, and therefore 
it is difficult to follow. In contrast, the European model headed by the General Data 
Protection Regulation seems to be the model to be followed by various legislatures in the 
absence of a North American model178. 
 
174 Council of Europe. Modernisation of the Data Protection “Convention 108”. Council of Europe. Available 
at https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/28-january-data-protection-day-factsheet.  
175   Greenleaf, G. (2018). The UN Should Adopt Data Protection Convention 108 as a Global Treaty: 
Submission on ‘The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age’ to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, to 
the Human Rights Council, and to the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy. UNSW Law Research Paper 
No. 18-24. 
176 Ibid. 
177 Ibid. 
178  Reinsch, W. (2018). Must Third Countries Choose Between EU or U.S. Digital Trade Protection 
Preferences?. Center for Strategic & International Studies. Available at https://www.csis.org/blogs/future-
digital-trade-policy-and-role-us-and-uk/must-third-countries-choose-between-eu-or-us  
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The European model is based on the General Data Protection Regulation that has an 
expansive effect, that is, that the effects of the GDPR will not be contained in the European 
Union, but cover the entire world, therefore, the businesses that process data from of the 
European Union had to change or adapt their practices179. The expansive effect is typical of 
GDPR, but it is also possible to explain it through the "Brussels Effect" developed by 
Professor Bradford. It is pointed out that the European Union exerts its influence on the rest 
of the world through its standards and legal institutions180. Professor Bradford points out 
that the European Union, without the need to use international institutions or seek 
cooperation from other countries, has a growing ability to enact regulations that are 
embedded in legal systems or regulatory frameworks of developed markets, causing a kind 
of Europeanization of the other countries181. In the case of the European model of data 
protection, GDPR expands its application to countries outside the orbit of the European 
Union, and therefore companies that are affected by GDPR will have to change their policies 
and / or practices regarding the data protection. The change in practices not only occurs in 
foreign companies but also influences policies to promote much more robust and effective 
data protection. 
 
On the one hand, the "Brussels effect" plus the expansive effect of the GDPR causes the 
behaviour of foreign companies to be affected, but it has also been seen that foreign legal 
systems have adopted European guidelines regarding privacy. Professor Greenleaf points 
out through his studies that the implementation of European principles regarding data 
privacy in countries outside the European Union continues to be substantial182. The result of 
the investigation shows that significant countries in terms of the highest GDP outside the 
European Union have implemented on average 5.95 out of 10 European principles regarding 
data privacy183. There are several reasons why it is possible to explain why countries outside 
the European Union decide to implement foreign principles or basically transplant laws from 
one country to another. On the one hand, the monetary aspect is evident since it is not 
 
179 GÜN+PARTNERS. (2016). The New EU General Data Protection Regulation with an Extra-Territorial 
Effect. GÜN+PARTNERS. Available at https://gun.av.tr/tr/goruslerimiz/makaleler/the-new-eu-general-data-
protection-regulation-with-an-extra-territorial-effect  
180  Bradford, A. (2012). The Brussels Effect. Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 107, No. 1, 2012. 
181 Ibid. 
182  Greenleaf, G. (2017). ‘European’ Data Privacy Standards Implemented in Laws Outside Europe. (2017) 
149 Privacy Laws & Business International Report 21-23. 
183 Ibid 
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necessary to spend money looking for an adequate way to create a law, saving money when 
taking a foreign law and applying it saves time, money, and also the trial and error 
methodology. It is clear that the aspect of transplanting legislation from one country to 
another produces positive effects and minimizes adverse effects since it is possible to learn 
from the mistakes of other countries and overcome problems effectively because those 
problems have already been faced previously. 
 
The American model lacks a comprehensive system for regulating data protection. When 
analyzing the North American system, it is possible to realize that it is regulated explicitly 
across sectors, such as HIPAA, which is the regulation that stipulates how personally 
identifiable information maintained by healthcare and policyholders must protect it from 
theft and fraud; FERPA is a federal law that aims to protect the privacy of student education 
records; COPPA is a federal law that imposes specific requirements on the operators of 
websites or online services that aim to protect the personal information of children under the 
age of 13, etc. The North American system has a limited scope, and it is not possible to 
observe a legal structure, nor a data protection law that is applied in the entire territory. On 
the other hand, the European model does have a complete data protection system that can 
influence countries outside the European Union, that it is possible to regulate global markets 
through data protection, and that it also provides many more guarantees regarding 
fundamental rights towards its users. 
 
It is irrelevant to the author of this thesis whether the European Union has a direct intention 
to seek replication of its model in countries outside the European Union. However, it is not 
possible to deny the benefits of adopting similar policies regarding data protection for the 
European Union. One of the apparent benefits is that cooperation between businesses is 
facilitated since they are governed by the same law. In addition, the fact that countries 
outside the European Union follow the EU data protection model brings benefits in terms of 
the protection of fundamental guarantees, such as art 8 EU Charter. 
 
3.2 European Union model contrasted with the United States model. 
 
The current European model is based on the General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”) 
that came to replace the European Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC. The directive 
establishes a minimum of data privacy and security standards in which each member state 
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of the European Union should implement it in its legislation184. However, the board was 
unable to meet the challenges of modern society such as using the bank online, social 
networks began to be used on a massive scale, and privacy around large companies began 
to be affected185. 
 
As previously seen, the protection of privacy and the protection of personal data are 
enshrined at the constitutional and human rights level. Article 8 of the EU Charter 
establishes the right to the protection of personal data in which there must be processing 
with a legitimate basis, the right to access that data, to be rectified, etc. Furthermore, Article 
8 ECHR establishes the right to privacy and family life. 
 
While the European Union bases its personal data protection on fundamental rights, the 
protection of data in the United States is primarily based on the protection of consumers 
against unfair practices 186 . The United States Constitution does not have an express 
reference to the right to privacy or data protection, but through its Fourth Amendment, the 
citizens of the United States are protected against the unreasonable searches and seizures 
made by the United States government. As previously developed, the United States Supreme 
Court justices have developed through jurisprudence a right to privacy for citizens of the 
United States. The above presents a problem, and one would tend to think that the Supreme 
Court Justices are filling the gaps that the law has left without protection, however, it is 
evident that the United States Constitution plus the work of the Judges of the Court Suprema 
and its jurisprudence cannot grant adequate protection to people's privacy taking into 
account the technological advances that exist. The recent cases of the Supreme Court187 
demonstrate that there is an evident outdating on the part of the precepts created during the 
20th century when it comes to being applied to cases concerning 21st-century technology. 
 
 
184  European Union. (1995). Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such 
Data. 
185 Yulia Vangorodska, ESQ. Google Sued For Illegally Scanning Emails. Yulia Vangorodska, ESQ. New 
York Commercial Litigation. Available at https://www.nylitigationfirm.com/google-sued-for-illegally-
scanning-emails/.  
186  ICLG. USA: Data Protection 2019. The International Comparative Legal Guides. Available at 
https://iclg.com/practice-areas/data-protection-laws-and-regulations/usa.  
187  McCubbin, S. (2018). Summary: The Supreme Court Rules in Carpenter v. United States. Lawfare. 
Available at https://www.lawfareblog.com/summary-supreme-court-rules-carpenter-v-united-states.  
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Professor Schwartz points out that although the United States played a crucial role in the 
international sector in terms of development and debates around privacy, the rest of the 
world has followed the model of the European Union establishing laws to protect the 
personal data European style188. However, despite the leading role that the United States had 
when discussing privacy in the international sphere, it has been observed that to date there 
is no general law on data protection, but rather various laws that regulate sectors specific 
data. 
 
Although there is no general federal law on data protection, there are federal data protection 
laws that usually are concerned with the protection of specific sectors: 
 
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”) 189  provides protection to 
students for the purpose of granting inspection and review rights with the goal of keeping 
the student's records as accurate as possible, and the disclosure of those records or personal 
information without the consent of the student or parent is also prohibited; The Health 
Information Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”)190 provides protection to the 
information maintained by health related institutions, provision of health care services or 
payment that are linked to a person; The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”)191 
It is intended to regulate phone calls and text messages made for marketing purposes or 
using automatic dial systems, or pre-recorded messages; The Fair and Accurate Credit 
Transactions Act (“FACTA”)192 It has the objective of restricting the use of the information 
of a subject referring to the credit capacity, general reputation, credit worthiness, credit 
standing; The Gramm Leach Bliley Act (“GLBA”)193 has the objective of regulating the 
obligations regarding the disclosure of personal information (Non-Public Personal 
Information) in the hands of banks, insurers and other financial companies. There is a range 
of laws that seek the protection of specific sectors, such as personal information, video rental 
records, family, telephone, etc194. 
 
188  Schwartz, P. (2013). The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and Procedures. 126 Harvard 
Law Review 1966. 
189  20 U.S. Code § 1232g. “Family educational and privacy rights” 
190  29 U.S. Code § 1181. “Increased portability through limitation on preexisting condition exclusions” 
191  47 U.S. Code § 227. “Restrictions on use of telephone equipment” 
192  15 U.S. Code § 1681. “Congressional findings and statement of purpose” 
193  15 U.S. Code § 6802. “Obligations with respect to disclosures of personal information” 
194  Levin, A., Nicholson, M. (2006). Privacy Law in the United States, the EU and Canada: The Allure of the 
Middle Ground. University of Ottawa Law & Technology Journal, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 357-395, 2005. 
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Although there is a specific sector regulation at the federal level, states can enact laws that 
impose more significant restrictions and obligations on businesses that seek the collection, 
processing, use of special categories of information such as medical records, biometric data, 
among other data categories195. In addition, all states have enacted data breach notification 
laws that apply to residents of those states. What is unique about these regulations is that 
even if a business does not have a physical presence in those states, they must comply with 
that law when they are faced with unauthorized access by residents of specific states196. 
 
The United States' approach to personal data protection is difficult to understand. At first 
glance, it is possible to argue that the regulatory system of data protection is focused on 
sector laws, focused on consumers and voluntary regulation, in these cases it is not possible 
to speak of adequate protection for personal data of individuals. When we analyze the 
European case, GDPR is the general norm that regulates data protection; therefore, its 
regulation is quite uniform throughout the member states. Now, it is possible to verify that 
there are different positions in the fundamental protection granted by both systems. However, 
one problem that is evident in the system imposed in the United States is that there is no 
clear definition of the terminology used in its approach through sectoral laws. For example, 
in the case of personal data, the United States refers to personal information, since its 
definition is not uniform throughout the states and their regulations; Certain data may be 
considered personal information for some purposes, but not for others197. In the case of the 
European Union, personal data is defined as any information related to the identification of 
a natural person198. The terminology of processing, controller, processor is not applicable in 
the system of the United States199.  
 
The federal and / or state laws of the United States do not have uniform concepts that 
 
195 See more, 740 ILCS 14/ “Biometric Information Privacy Act”; Tex. Bus. & Com. Code §503.001 “Capture 
or Use of Biometric Identifier”; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §19.375.020 “Enrollment, disclosure, and retention of 
biometric identifiers”. 
196 NCSL. (2020). Security Breach Notification Laws. NCSL National Conference of State Legislatures. 
Available at https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breach-
notification-laws.aspx  
197 ICLG, supra note 186. 
198 12) European Parliament and of the Council of Europe. (2016). Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation).  
199 ICLG, supra note 186. 
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facilitate the understanding of its rules. Moreover, the federal and state laws of the United 
States do not agree in a proper term that identifies an essential category such as what is 
understands personal information200. Professor Schwartz and Solove correctly point out that 
the approach of the United States model to the European Union model contains similarities 
and differences, for example, the principles of data minimization, transparency and data 
quality exist in both legal systems, while the automated decision-making principles, the need 
for a legal basis for data collection and processing, restriction on data transfers, additional 
protection for sensitive data cannot be found in the United States model, but in the European 
Union201. 
 
It is clear that the European Union and the United States have different philosophies 
regarding privacy and the protection of personal data202. Despite the fact that the laws of the 
European Union and the States are beginning to use the same language regarding data 
protection, it is still possible to find significant differences203. The underlying problem that 
exists today in the United States is that the protection of personal data does not seek its 
protection as in the European Union since while the European Union sees the protection of 
the privacy of personal data as a fundamental right, The United States does not see it this 
way. It seems that the United States system has chosen to have a protection system for 
personal data focused on sectors and not opting for a comprehensive data protection system 
as the model of the European Union since it seeks to avoid a conflict of interests, a clash 
between rights. 
 
The point of view of the author of this thesis is that the prevailing system in the United States 
offers rather vague protection to natural persons, and also does not change the conduct of 
business when operating in the processing of personal data. However, there seems to be hope 
in the latest laws enacted in the United States, such as the California Consumer Privacy Act 
(“CCPA”)204 that seems to approach the European Model. 
 
 
200 Schwartz, P., Solove, D. (2014). Reconciling Personal Information in the United States and European Union. 
California Law Review, 102(4), 877-916. Retrieved April 19, 2020, from www.jstor.org/stable/23784355 
201 Id. at 900-904. 
202 Zanfir, G. (2012). EU and US Data Protection Reforms: A Comparative View. EIRP Proceedings, Vol 7 
(2012). 
203 Id. 
204 Cal. Civ. Code §1798.100, “California Consumer Privacy Act”. 
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3.3 A common point between both models. 
 
The question to answer now is whether the European model has influenced the model of the 
United States, or if there are signs that the American model is adopting principles of the 
European model. It has already been explained previously that the model of the United States 
is characterized by enacting laws for specific sectors, and that in addition its personal data 
protection system is divided into different federal and / or state laws. Although there are no 
efforts by the federal power to enact robust data protection laws, it has been the different 
states that have sought the enactment of laws that seek the protection of personal data, 
resembling the style of the European model. 
 
The state of California recently enacted a law in 2018 that creates new rights for consumers 
regarding elimination, and the sharing of personal data that different businesses collect from 
their consumers. The law in question is the California Consumer Privacy Act ("CCPA")205 
with the objective of providing more robust protection in terms of protecting the data of 
California consumers. However, CCPA is not the first effort by this State to grant a victory 
in the search for greater protections to the privacy of the people since in 1972 the right to 
privacy was included in the Constitution of the State of California206. 
 
California is one of the 10 states to enshrine the right to privacy at the level of its 
constitution207. That can be set a precedent and a state commitment to the importance of 
people's privacy. The first draft of CCPA was born as an initiative to grant three fundamental 
rights to California consumers: 
 
a) The right to know what kind of data businesses had collected about them; where they 
had got this information from; and also, how this data was to be used, sold, or 
disclosed; 
b) A right for consumers to "opt-out" of the sale or disclosure of that data for 
commercial purposes; 
 
205 Id. at §1798.100-199 
206 Clark Kelso, J. (1992). California's Constitutional Right to Privacy. 19 Pepp. L. Rev. Iss. 2. Available at: 
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol19/iss2/1 
207 NCSL. (2018). Privacy Protections in State Constitutions. NCSL National Conference of State Legislatures. 
Available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-andinformation- 
technology/privacy-protections-in-state-constitutions.aspx.  
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c) and also, the right to be able to sue the businesses that were against these rights208. 
 
A.B. 375 retains the fundamental rights enshrined in the first draft, but rights were also added 
to people seeking to know what kind of personnel data it is collecting about them; know if 
that personal data will be sold or disclosed; know to whom that personal data will be sold or 
disclosed; to refuse or refuse on the sale of this personal data, and in the case of refusing it, 
the right to the same service is protected in equal conditions and price with respect to the 
people who did not refuse209. 
 
The California Consumer Privacy Act can be understood as the fruit of the influence of the 
European model on the model of the United States. However, despite the consecration of 
specific rights in CCPA similar to those contained in the General Data Protection Regulation, 
it is possible to find specific differences. 
 
The first thing to note is the scope of both standards, on the one hand, we are talking about 
CCPA that defines a consumer as “a natural person who is a California resident”210 while 
GDPR does not have as a requirement the residence of a particular state. CCPA generally 
applies to businesses that collect personal data from consumers who do business in the State 
of California, and who meet any of the requirements of having annual gross revenue of 
25,000,000, buy, sell, receive or share for purposes commercials the information of more 
than 50,000 consumers California residents211. The point in common here with GDPR is its 
extraterritoriality. However, scopes of the type of health information are not contained in 
CCPA, while in GDPR, they are covered. 
 
CCPA is an unanticipated result of United States law, which restores rights to consumers, 
and not only seeks transparency in the data processing. It is possible to point out that CCPA 
has much more in common than GDPR than the other privacy laws of the United States212. 
 
208 Ross, M., Mactaggart, A. (2017). “The Consumer Right to Privacy Act of 2018” – Version 2 No. 17-0039. 
CAL. OFFICE OF THE ATT'Y GEN. Available at https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/17-
0039%20%28Consumer%20Privacy%20V2%29.pdf 
209 Cal. Civ. Code §1798.100, “California Consumer Privacy Act”. 
210 Ibid. 
211 Id.at §1798.140 
212 Kalyvas, J., Millendorf, S., Overly, M., Ridley, E., Surpin, B., Howell, C., Rathburn, J., Tantleff, A. (2018). 
California Moves Towards GDPR-Like Privacy Protections in the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018. 
61 
 
However, despite CCPA seeking to empower consumers with regard to their information 
and California being the fifth largest economy in the world213, CCPA does not prevent 
businesses from stopping to collect information from California consumers, nor does it give 
them the opportunity to stop the collection of personal data information. 
 
Although there are differences between GDPR and CCPA, it is necessary to focus on the 
similarities of CCPA with the European model. The definitions of personal information and 
personal data are quite similar in both regulations, an example of this is that CPPA defines 
personal information as “information that identifies, relates to, describes, is capable of being 
associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular 
consumer or household”214 while GDPR defines personal data in Art. 4 (1),  “Personal data 
are any information which is related to an identified or identifiable natural person”215. Both 
regulations are also similar in terms of the rights they grant their individuals, 
pseudonymization and special protection for children. The right to information is found in 
both legal bodies in which it is sought that the end-user of the right is informed about the 
type of data that is being collected, with what scope and for what purpose. Both mechanisms 
oblige the entities to put mechanisms in place regarding the activation of these rights by the 
indicated persons, portability of the data and rectification of it. 
 
As the author of this thesis has previously pointed out, it is not possible to say that the GDPR 
and the CCPA have the same powers, but rather it is possible to observe an approach by the 
CCPA towards the European model that cannot be observed in other laws of the United 
States. 
 
When navigating the data protection system of the United States, it is possible to observe a 
large number of laws focused on data protection but in a focused way across sectors. 
However, it is possible to observe a tendency to create new legislation that covers the United 
 
FOLEY & LARDNER LLP. Available at https://www.foley.com/california-moves-towards-gdpr-like-
privacy-protections-in-thecalifornia-consumer-privacy-act-of-2018-07-02-2018/ 
213 Ximénez de Sandoval, P. (2018). California ya es la quinta mayor economía del mundo. El País. Available 
at https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/05/09/opinion/1525882179_659426.html.  
214 19) Cal. Civ. Code §1798.140, “California Consumer Privacy Act”. 
215 12) European Parliament and of the Council of Europe. (2016). Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation). Article 4(1). 
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States in general216. However, this would raise many questions as to how a federal level law 
would exceed the laws of the states. A law on the protection of personal data of a national 
nature would totally change the approach that the United States has had towards data 
protection, it would bring much more clarity to its system characterized by regulation across 
sectors. It is not talking about granting greater protections to the citizens of the United States 
but would change the model of the United States through the regulation of sectors towards 
a generalized model like the European model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
216 Wagner, A., Arensberg, T. (2020). Proposed Legislation for Security in the Digital Age. JDSUPRA. 
Available at https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/proposed-legislation-for-security-in-55807/  
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CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has sought to draw a parallel between the right to data protection in the model of 
the United States and the model of the European Union. Both models have different 
characteristics marked explicitly by the way in which the right to privacy is understood. 
 
On the one hand, in the United States model, the right to privacy is not explicitly enshrined 
in its Constitution, in which U.S. Justice Louis Brandeis referred to the right to privacy as 
the right to be left alone, and throughout the course of the 20th century, the Supreme Court 
of the United States provided people with some protection of privacy through various 
amendments. On the other hand, the European Union model makes an express recognition 
of the right to privacy in both Article 8 ECHR and Article 7 EU Charter. 
 
The right to privacy contains a belief that seeks to restrain the involvement of the 
government and private actors towards the private affairs of individuals. In the past, the right 
to privacy could be dealt with from a much more closed spectrum, since technology at that 
time did not pose a significant threat. However, today we live in a modern society in which 
the individuals of a society are continually handing over personal data to companies in order 
to receive a service. The above presents a series of risks since devices such as a simple cell 
phone collect data from its users at levels never thought before. The majority of government 
institutions or private institutions are the actors that threaten the right to privacy in a modern 
era such as the one in which we live. Concerns have escalated to a higher level when we see 
that companies like Cambridge Analytica have used the data collected by Facebook to 
influence the political decisions of large numbers of people. 
 
When living in a modern society with new technologies, there must be a balance between 
privacy and how we disclose information to third parties, after all, the right to privacy is a 
personal right, and also a human right. The collection of personal data is placed as a threat 
to this privacy; therefore, data protection regulations are of utmost importance. Data 
protection can be a broad term, but it regularly includes the collection, use, and 
dissemination of individuals' personal information. The primary purpose of the protection 
of personal data is not only its protection but also the protection of the fundamental rights 
and freedoms that correspond to the person who corresponds to that data. As we have pointed 
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out before, there is an express recognition of privacy and the right to data protection in 
international treaties. 
 
Data is becoming a precious commodity in which it is in constant movement with the aim 
of providing services. The data processing that occurs today increases the difficulty for 
people to maintain control over their personal data that they are sharing with different 
companies. Data protection refers to the system of practices, assurances, rules, procedures, 
etc. that seek to protect them. Each legislation can adopt different regulations that contain 
the necessary mechanisms for data protection. However, today there are two models of 
personal data protection that have established themselves as the main actors in the 
international sphere. The United States model is characterized by regulation of specific data 
sectors that are difficult to follow and only provides minimal protection in terms of data 
protection. While the European Union model focuses on the regulation of data protection in 
a general and easily understood way. Now, the model of the European Union has positioned 
itself as a benchmark for various laws. Third world countries have sought to guide their 
model to data protection taking the European Union model as a reference because it is much 
cheaper to implement a model that has already been proven effective. In addition, the 
European Union has managed to impose its influence to export the protection of fundamental 
rights and freedoms to other sectors outside the European Union. This can be explained on 
the basis that to date, the European Union model in terms of data protection, has been the 
most effective when compared to the United States model. 
 
The United States has had a crucial role in the international sector in developing the debates 
regarding privacy; however, the rest of the world has followed the model of the European 
Union because the approach of the United States is hard to understand. First, there is no 
general regulation on the protection of data, but we find a multiplicity of laws concentrated 
in different sectors, concentrated on consumers and a voluntary regulation that does not 
present the necessary guarantees to protect personal data from users. 
 
It is true that a different approach to data protection is possible, but the regulation proposed 
by the United States has not solved fundamental problems such as a uniform definition of 
personal data or the existence of cases that data can be considered as personal or not. 
However, although there are fundamental differences in data protection in the model of the 
United States and the European Union, there are also certain similarities in which the 
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principles of data minimization, transparency and data quality are found in both models. 
 
The United States model offers quite a precarious protection to natural persons and fails to 
significantly influence business conduct, while the European Union system seeks the 
protection of data as a human right since managed to shape business conduct. Although there 
is a multiplicity of models, the two models that have managed to position themselves as 
referents have been two, the model of the United States and the model of the European Union. 
The last question that has been answered is about why the model of the European Union has 
become a benchmark for countries outside the European Union to influence the model of 
the United States. 
 
As previously demonstrated, there have been no efforts by the federal power to enact laws 
that seek to strengthen data protection, but rather the states themselves have sought to enact 
laws that seek to strengthen data protection. data protection similar to the model of the 
European Union. One of these states is the state of California. 
 
The State of California enacted during the year 2018 the California Consumer Privacy Act 
with the objective of promoting robust protection regarding the protection of the data of 
California consumers. California is considered the fifth economy in the world, and CCPA is 
not its first victory in terms of privacy since it is one of the 10 states that has recognized the 
right to privacy at a constitutional level. 
 
It is possible to observe an approach to the model of the European Union through the 
legislative work of the States. Recent developments in data protection at the state level give 
clear indications of an approach of the United States model towards the European model. 
However, although it is possible to argue that CCPA has much more in common with GDPR 
than other privacy laws in the United States, CCPA does not stop businesses from continuing 
to collect information from California consumers and / or does not give them an opportunity 
to stop data collection. 
 
It is not possible to maintain that GDPR and CCPA are sister laws that grant the same powers 
and value the system to data protection in the same way, but it is possible to observe an 
approach of the state of California to the model of the European Union that makes one think 
that this type of enactment of laws will be replicated throughout the United States. 
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It is still necessary to observe the development and influence that CCPA will have on the 
other States in the United States. California has been a leader in privacy protection in the 
past, but it remains to be seen how the relationship between businesses and their clients will 
develop in the future. If the steps taken by California are analysed, similar paths will be 
taken in other States. However, federal legislation needs to provide a set of rules that meets 
the expectations of United States citizens and the principles of Human Rights. 
 
We are in a unique situation in which there is an opportunity to seek the protection of our 
privacy, and of our digital identity with which we interact day by day. It is necessary that 
the States take the central role when searching for the protection of personal data, and that 
businesses are able to recognize and follow these rules. 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ACHR   The American Convention on Human Rights. 
CCPA   California Consumer Privacy Act. 
CJEU   Court of Justice of the European Union. 
CRC   Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
ECHR European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. 
ECtHR  European Court of Human Rights. 
EU Charter  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
GDPR   General Data Protection Regulation. 
IACtHR  The Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
ICCPR   The International Convention on Civil and Political Rights. 
ICRMW International Convention on the protection of All Migrant Workers 
and Member of their Families. 
OAS   Organization of American States. 
OECD   Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
UDHR   Universal Declaration on Human Rights. 
UN   United Nations. 
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